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I. Introduction
In the space of roughly two centuries, the Supreme Court has moved from
the basement of the Senate to the crossfire of today's culture war.2 As judicial
decisions address issues like "same-sex marriage," abortion, school prayer,
affirmative action, pornography, illegal immigration, enemy combatants, the
Ten Commandments, and the Pledge of Allegiance, both sides in these debates
recognize that the courts have essentially become the last step in the legislative
process.3 Last year Chief Justice Rehnquist commented on the increased
criticism of the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court.4 The 2004
presidential campaign highlighted the deep divisions over the federal courts and
their role.5 Both sides of the ideological spectrum recognize the judiciary's
tremendous power. Justice William J. Brennan once stated,
The Supreme Court has been, and is, called upon to solve many of the most
fundamental issues confronting our democracy, including many upon which
our society, consciously or unconsciously, is most deeply divided, and that
arouse the deepest emotions. Their resolution, one way or the other, often
rewrites our future history.6
Likewise, Justice Antonin Scalia observed,
What secret knowledge, one must wonder, is breathed into lawyers when
they become Justices of this Court, that enables them to discern that a
practice which the text of the Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and
2. See Jonathan Rauch, State of the Union: Bipolar Disorder, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Jan./Feb. 2005, at 102, 102 (tracing the history and popular meaning of "culture war").
3. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JuDGEs 57-
59 (2003) (explaining the Court's influence on issues like free speech, public religious
expression, radical feminism, and homosexuality); see also Paul Starr, Winning Cases, Losing
Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2005, at A17 (attributing Democratic losses in 2004 to their
strategy of pursuing their agenda in the courts).
4. See William Rehnquist, 2004 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 4 (2005)
(noting that criticism of judges "has dramatically increased" recently), available at
http://www.supreme courtus.gov/publicinf0/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf; David Davenport
& Gordon Lloyd, A Protest Too Far, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 19,2005, at A17 (linking criticism to
fact that more people see that courts are "making policy on matters beyond their purview").
5. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Both Sides Say Court Future up to Voters, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 28, 2004, at A21 (noting that to both sides Supreme Court nominees are the "most far-
reaching prize" of the election); Tara Ross, Judicial Nominations, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
ONLINE, at http://www.taemag.com/printVersion/print-article.asp?articleID=18183 (noting the
importance ofjudicial nominees in the last election) (last visited May 10, 2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE SUPREMACISTS: THE TYRANNY OF JUDGES AND How TO STOP
IT 9 (2004) (quoting Justice Brennan's speech at Park School, Baltimore, Md., on Nov. 21,
1982).
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which our people have regarded as constitutional for 200 years, is in fact
unconstitutional?... Day by day, case by case, [the Court] is busy
7designing a Constitution for a country I do not recognize.
So is the federal judiciary still Hamilton's "least dangerous branch,0 one that is
constantly subject to encroachment, intimidation, and retaliation from the
majoritarian branches?9 Or has it become Judge Roy Moore's "despotic
branch,"' 0 one that has usurped legislative authority to become "sovereign
forces for permanent revolution"?"
In order to address this issue, the 108th Congress revived a debate that
remained dormant for almost a quarter century: jurisdiction-limiting
legislation. To supporters, this legislation represents the essence of
constitutional government as Congress restrains runaway federal judges from
addressing issues like marriage and the Pledge. To opponents, this legislation
undermines the foundation of our constitutional freedoms-the separation of
powers and an independent judiciary.12 This Note seeks to explain the pending
legislation, show that the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to
withdraw certain cases and controversies from the federal courts' jurisdiction,
and address the common constitutional arguments against this proposition.
Though absent from the halls of Congress, the jurisdiction withdrawal
debate in academic literature is "choking on redundancy."'13 However, this
7. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
8. TiE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 520 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carl Van Doren ed., 1973).
9. See James Podgers, ABA Meeting Ends With Two Busy Days, 4 ABA JOURNAL
EREPORT 33, Aug. 12, 2005, http://abanet.org/joumal/redesign/aull2house.html (quoting Justice
Breyer's statement that "the greater concern for the judiciary... is a larger 'lack of support for
the institution"') (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Mandy Erickson, In
Discussion, Top Justices Voice Concerns About Threats to Judicial Independence, STANFORD
REPORT, Oct. 27, 2004, http://news-service.standford.edu/news/2004/october27/judicial-
1027.html (quoting Justice Breyer on the Court's budget limits and California Supreme Court
Chief Justice George on the judiciary's vulnerability) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 2, 4 (noting increased criticism of federal judges).
10. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. 78
(2004) [hereinafter Constitution Hearing] (statement of Roy S. Moore).
11. ROBERT NISBET, PREJUDICES: A PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 210 (1982), quoted in
BORK, supra note 3, at 10; see also, Davenport & Lloyd, supra note 4 (attributing criticism of
courts to increasing role in policy matters).
12. See infra Part IV.C-D (examining separation of powers and judicial independence
objections).
13. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 897 n.9 (1984); see also
Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the
Original Understanding ofArticle Il, 132 U. PA. L. Rv. 741,742 n.3 (1984) (listing literature
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subject has a renewed degree of timeliness as scholars like Erwin Chemerinsky
worry that the Supreme Court could affirm Congress's power.14 After twenty-
five years of congressional silence, the 108th Congress handled four of these
bills. More importantly, the House of Representatives passed two of them.
Clearly, the issue is back before Congress.'5 With criticism of the judiciary
rising, this legislation will continue to appear as an increasingly attractive
restraint.16 After the Republican gains in the 2004 election, the three primary
bills are again pending before the 109th Congress. In addition, while many
authors have addressed this subject, few delve into the writings and debates of
the Founding era to show how the Exceptions Clause dovetails with the
dominant political attitudes, principles, and statements of the time. This Note
attempts to set the Exceptions Clause in its historical context and use the
historical record to illuminate past congressional actions and court precedents
that affect the current legislation.
To accomplish these goals, Part II surveys the jurisdiction withdrawal
legislation proposed in the 108th Congress and pending before the 109th
Congress. In so doing, it outlines the current state of the controversy and
provides a backdrop for the rest of the Note. Part III lays out the affirmative
case for Congress's plenary control of the federal courts' jurisdiction. It shows
that the Constitution's text, its foundational principles, congressional practice,
and court precedent confirm Congress's power. Part IV responds to some
common constitutional objections.
11. Current Legislation
Jurisdiction limiting bills are not new. During the 1970s and 1980s,
several bills proposed stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction over school
on subject to date); Julian Velasco, Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 671 n.1 (1997) (same).
14. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of
Restrictions on Federal Court Jurisdiction in Immigration Cases, 29 U. MEM. L. REv. 295,
298-99 (1999) (expressing concern that judicial deference to Congress in immigration might
cause the Court to affirm Congress's broad power over jurisdiction).
15. See Alexander K. Hooper, Recent Development, Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Pledge
Protection Act of 2004, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 511, 513 ("This surge of court-stripping
legislation is the strongest since the early 1980s ... ").
16. See sources cited supra note 9 (noting concerns about increased criticism of the
courts); see also Davenport & Lloyd, supra note 4 (tracing censure of courts); see generally
MARK LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: How THE SUPREME COURT Is DESTROYING AMERICA (2005)
(giving an example of the new rising criticism of the judiciary); SCHLAFLY, supra note 6 (same);
BORK, supra note 3 (same).
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prayer, abortion, and busing cases. 7 Between 1935 and 1981, at least sixty-
four such bills were introduced in Congress. 8  However, most died in
committee, and none gained widespread support. 19 The four bills from the
108th Congress are noteworthy because the House of Representatives passed
two of them.2° This Part examines the three that received substantial attention
and their counterparts in the 109th Congress, and Part IV explains the
objections to them.
A. The Marriage Protection Act of 2005-H.R. 1100
On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives passed the Marriage
Protection Act of 2004 (H.R. 3313)2" to limit federal court jurisdiction over
cases involving the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).22 DOMA ensures that
no state will be forced to recognize an out-of-state "same-sex marriage"
license. 3 The Marriage Protection Act removes cases involving DOMA's
interpretation and constitutionality from the jurisdiction of both the lower
federal courts and the Supreme Court.24 It does not dictate a decision on the
17. See H.R. REP. No. 108-614, at 157 (2004) (referencing 1970sjurisdiction withdrawal
bills).
18. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 744 nn.4-5 (listing bill numbers for these proposals).
19. See, e.g., S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981) (noting that a bill to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction in abortion cases died in committee); H.R. 900,97th Cong. (1981) (same); see also
WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 42 (11 th
ed. 2001) (giving text of Senator Helms's 1979 proposal to strip federal courts ofjurisdiction
over school prayer cases); PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 237 (5th ed. 2004) (outlining 1970s and 1980s proposals
and noting that none passed).
20. See infra Part II.A & II.C (noting that two jurisdiction limiting bills passed the
House).
21. See 150 CONG. REc. H6612 (daily ed. July 22, 2004) (stating that the Marriage
Protection Act of 2004 passed the House 233-194). The Marriage Protection Act of 2005 (H.R.
1100) is identical to H.R. 3313, and it is currently pending before the House Judiciary
Committee. See 151 CONG. REc. H982 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (introducing the Marriage
Protection Act of 2005 and referring it to the House Judiciary Committee).
22. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 108-614, at 2 (2004) (summarizing provisions of DOMA).
24. See id. at 2 (quoting Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2004)).
The relevant portion of the bill's text is as follows: "No court created by Act of Congress shall
have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or
decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of,
[DOMA] or this section." Id.; see also id. at 22 (setting forth the Congressional Budget Office's
statement that H.R. 3313 would preclude federal courts from reviewing DOMA and H.R. 3313).
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merits; it simply prevents federal courts from "hear[ing] or decid[ing]" these
cases. 5 It merely forces them to remain silent on the issue.
The House justified H.R. 3313 by reviewing the "same-sex marriage"
controversy. Not only did DOMA pass overwhelmingly in both houses of
Congress,26 but most states have also relied on it either to limit marriage to one
man and one woman27 or to outlaw "same-sex marriage." 28 Nevertheless, the
House feared that federal courts would rule that DOMA "violates either the
Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, or some other constitutional provision."29 Congress did not dictate
results to the courts; 30 rather it sought to "ensure that the states, and not
unelected Federal judges, have the final say on whether they must accept same-
sex marriage licenses issued in other states."'"
B. The Constitution Restoration Act of2005-H.R. 1070 & S. 520
In February 2004, Senator Richard Shelby (Rep. Ala.) and Representative
Robert Aderholt (Rep. Ala.) introduced companion legislation entitled the
Constitution Restoration Act of 2004.32 Among other things, this bill restricted
the jurisdiction of both the federal district courts and the Supreme Court so that
they could not review cases challenging a government official's
"acknowledgement of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or
government." 33 This bill would have prevented the federal courts from hearing
25. See id. at 2 (referencing the text of the bill).
26. See id. (showing that DOMA passed the House 342-67 and the Senate 85-14).
27. See id. at 3 (stating that forty-four states, constituting eighty-eight percent of the states
and eighty-six percent of the population, have laws that define marriage to include only one man
and one woman).
28. See id. (noting that thirty-eight states reject out-of-state "same-sex marriages").
29. See id. at 3-4 (recounting Congress's fears in light ofLMwence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003)).
30. See id. at 2 ("H.R. 3313 does not attempt to dictate results: it only places final
authority over whether states must accept same-sex marriage licenses granted in other states in
the hands of the states themselves.").
31. Id. at 4.
32. See 150 CONG. REc. S1286 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2004) (introducing S. 2082); 150
CONG. REc. H514 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2004) (introducing H.R. 3799).
33. Constitution Restoration Act of2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. §§ 101(a)(l), 102(aXl)
(2004); Constitution Restoration Act, S. 2082, 108th Cong. §§ 101(aXl) 102(a)(l) (2004). The
relevant portions of these bills state:
[T]he Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of
certiorari, or otherwise, any matter to the extent that relief is sought against an
element of Federal, State, or local government, or against an officer of Federal,
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"legal challenges to such things as public displays of the Ten Commandments,
our national motto 'In God We Trust,' 'One Nation Under God,' invocations of
prayer at public functions by public officials, and the like. 34 These bills did
not leave the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, but the House did hold
hearings. 35 Senator Shelby and Representative Aderholt reintroduced this
legislation in the 109th Congress, and it is now pending before the respective
Judiciary Committees.36
C. The Pledge Protection Act of2005-H.R. 2389 & S. 1046
On September 23,2004, the House of Representatives passed the Pledge
Protection Act of 2004. 37 Like the previous two bills, it prevented both the
lower federal courts and the Supreme Court from "hear[ing] or decid[ing] any
question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the
Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance... or its recitation. 38 However, it
exempted the District of Columbia courts from this limitation. 39 H.R. 2028
did not permit schools to coerce students into saying the Pledge,40 but it
prevented federal courts from invalidating the Pledge and "reserve[ed] to the
State, or local government... by reason of that element's or officer's
acknowledgement of God as the sovereign source of law, liberty, or
government.... [T]he district court shall not have jurisdiction of a matter if the
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to review that matter...."
Id. §§ 101(a)(1), 102(a)(1). These bills also contain provisions regarding the use of
international law and impeachment; however, those issues are outside the scope of this Note.
34. Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 85 (statement of Roy Moore).
35. See 150 CONG. REc. S1286 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2004) (introducing S. 2082); 150
CONG. REc. H514 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2004) (introducing H.R. 3799); see also Constitution
Hearing, supra note 10 (indicating the hearing).
36. See 151 CONG. REC. H980, S2004 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (introducing the
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005 in the House and Senate and referring it to the respective
Judiciary Committees).
37. See 150 CONG. REC. H7478 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (noting H.R. 2028's passage
247-173 (Roll #467)).
38. Pledge Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. § 2(a). In its relevant portion,
the bill reads: "No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to
the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance... or its
recitation." Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 108-691, at 2 (2004) ("H.R. 2028 would prevent Federal
courts from striking the words 'under God' from the Pledge of Allegiance.").
39. See H.R. 2028 § 2(a) (granting an exception to the District of Columbia courts).
40. See H.R. REP. No. 108-691, at 10 n.10 (stating that H.R. 2028 would not allow "the
coerced recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance" (citing W. Va. Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943))).
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state courts the authority to decide whether the Pledge is valid as written
within each state's boundaries."4 1 Thus, it did not mandate results to the
federal courts; it simply prevented them from deciding the issue one way or
the other.
The House passed this bill in response to the recent challenges to the
Pledge. Though the Supreme Court dismissed Newdow's constitutional
claim, 42 the House was concerned as "[t]he Supreme Court's decision not to
reach the merits of the case is apparently an effort to forestall a decision
adverse to the Pledge. '43 Newdow has since confirmed the House's fears by
filing new lawsuits over the Pledge on behalf of custodial parents in order to
get a judgment on the merits.44
Representative Todd Akin (Rep. Ohio) and Senator Jon Kyl (Rep. Ariz.)
introduced companion legislation in the 109th Congress that is similar to the
legislation the House passed in 2004.45 The Pledge Protection Act of 2005 is
identical to its 2004 predecessor with one exception: it exempts territorial
courts in addition to certain District of Columbia courts from the general bar
against federal jurisdiction." Thus, those courts would be allowed to hear
cases involving the Pledge. These proposals are pending before the
respective Judiciary Committees.47
41. Id. at 10.
42. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301,2312 (2004) (noting
Newdow's lack of standing).
43. Id. at 2312 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 108-691, at 9-10.
44. See Nation in Brief, WASH. POST, Jan. 6,2005, at A20 (stating that Newdow filed new
suit on behalf of eight co-plaintiffs, all of whom are custodial parents or children); see also
Newdow v. Congress, No. Civ. S-05-17 LKK/DAD, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19887, at *36 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 14, 2005) (stating that reciting the Pledge in school violates the Establishment Clause
due to the phrase "under God").
45. Pledge Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 2389, S. 1046, 109th Cong.
46. See id. § 2(a) (creating an exception to the limitation on federal court jurisdiction).
The relevant portion states:
The limitation in subsection (a) does not apply to-(1) any court established by
Congress under its power to make needful rules or regulations respecting the
territory of the United States; or (2) the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
or the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Id.
47. See 151 CONG. REc. S5300, H3434 (daily ed. May 17, 2005) (introduction the Pledge
Protection Act of 2005 in the House and Senate and referring it to the respective Judiciary
Committees).
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III. Congress's Control of Federal Jurisdiction
Part III of this Note sets out the affirmative case for Congress's plenary
control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts by examining five areas.
First, it shows that the text of the Constitution gives Congress this power.
Second, it demonstrates that Congress's power is consistent with the principles
embodied in the Constitution. Third, it illustrates that the Founding Fathers
intended for Congress to have this power. Fourth, it explains how Congress
has used this power throughout history. Finally, it notes that the federal
courts-including the Supreme Court-have repeatedly affirmed Congress's
control over their jurisdiction.
A. Constitutional Text-Article III
The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to regulate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.48 Section 1 of Article III lists the entities that
are vested with the judicial power. Because Congress can choose whether to
create lower courts, it also has the power to define the jurisdiction of those it
creates.49 Section 2 lists the cases and controversies that fall within the judicial
power and divides that list into two subsets. Of these two, the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction is unalterable, 50 but the Constitution specifically allows
Congress to adjust the other. For the purposes of this Note, Article III makes
four important points.
48. In its relevant parts, Article III states:
§ 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish....
§ 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies
between two or more States; . . .- between Citizens of different States;-between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States....
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those
in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.
In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.
49. See infra Part III.E.2 (discussing Congress's control of lower court jurisdiction).
50. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174-75 (1803) (rejecting arguments that
Congress can expand the Court's original jurisdiction).
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1. The Judicial Power-Article III, § 1
First, Article III confers "the judicial power of the United States" in
Section 1 and the first clause of Section 2. But the second clause of Section 2
covers "jurisdiction." While the two terms could be synonyms,51 the
Constitution distinguishes them.52 Jurisdiction is only a subset of the judicial
power; the two are not the same.53 Congress cannot control the judicial power
because the Constitution gives it to the judiciary. 54 The Founders rejected a
proposal that would have allowed Congress to control the judicial power.
55
Because the two are different, the judiciary always retains the judicial power
regardless of its jurisdiction.56
2. The Recipients of the Judicial Power-Article III, § 1
Second, Article III vests the judicial power "in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. 57 Some argue that Congress must vest the entire judicial power in
the federal judiciary as a whole.58 However, by repeating the word "in," the
Constitution does not require this.59 Rather it vests "the judicial power, the
entire judicial power, in the Supreme Court, and also in whatever inferior
courts Congress creates. The whole judicial power is vested separately in each;
it is not simply shared by the two."
60
51. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 709 n.187 (admitting that the two terms could be
interchangeable).
52. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 622-23 (1838) (distinguishing "judicial
power" and "jurisdiction" in Article III); see also John Harrison, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text ofArticle III, 64 U. Cm. L. REV. 203, 214-
20 (1997) (same).
53. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 709-13 (distinguishing between "judicial power" and
"jurisdiction"); Harrison, supra note 52, at 214-20 (same).
54. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 711 ("Congress has no control over the judicial
power.").
55. See id. at 711, 732 (examining the proposal that the Convention rejected).
56. See id. at 712 (arguing that limiting jurisdiction does not remove the judicial power).
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
58. See infra Part IV.B (discussing various mandatory jurisdiction theories).
59. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 700 (noting that judicial power is not vested in federal
judiciary as a whole).
60. Id.
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3. The Elements of the Judicial Power-Article 11, § 2, cl. 1
Third, the first clause of Section 2 lists the cases and controversies
included in the judicial power. Some argue that Congress can remove
"controversies" from the federal courts but not "cases.",61 This interpretation
confuses these terms. "Cases" refers to both civil and criminal actions, while
"controversies" includes only civil ones. Both Justice Iredell and legal
commentators of the time drew this distinction.63 Controversies are a subset of
cases, and so it is impossible for Congress to remove a controversy without also
removing a case. The more natural interpretation is that this clause lists the
items that comprise the judicial power.64
4. The Organization of the Judicial Power-Article I1, § 2, cl. 2
Last, the second clause of Section 2 organizes these items into two subsets
within the judicial power. The first-the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction-includes cases involving public ministers and cases involving a
state.65 The second-the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction-includes "all
the other Cases" mentioned in the first clause.6 6 As "controversies" are a type
of "cases," 67 everything in the first clause falls into either the appellate or
original jurisdiction.68 Then the second clause describes two features of the
61. See infra Part IV.B (discussing various mandatory jurisdiction theories).
62. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 707-08 (distinguishing "cases" and "controversies");
see also Harrison, supra note 52, at 220-29 (same); William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the
Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 89,
90 (1990) [hereinafter Casto, Orthodox View] (same).
63. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 430-32 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing between "cases" and "controversies"); 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 418-26 (South
Hackensack, N.J., Rothman Reprints 1969) (1803) [hereinafter TUCKER, COMMENTARIES],
reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTIoN 279 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) [hereinafter FOuNDERS'] (same).
64. See infra note 235 and accompanying text (showing that Chief Justice Jay adopted this
interpretation).
65. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (outlining the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction).
66. See id. (outlining the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction).
67. See supra Part III.A.3 (examining relationship between "cases" and "controversies").
68. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 719 (noting that the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction is not exclusive).
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appellate jurisdiction. First, it extends to both law and fact.69 Second, it is
subject to Congress's exceptions and regulations. 70 At the time, "regulations"
meant: "A rule or order prescribed by a superior for the management of some
business, or for the government of a company or society.'1 This allows
Congress to prescribe procedures for the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. "Exceptions" had a broader definition: "The act of excepting, or
excluding from a number designated, or from a description; exclusion."72 This
allows Congress to remove elements that would otherwise be within the Court's
appellate jurisdiction.
Some argue that the Exceptions Clause modifies "both as to Law and
Fact" rather than "appellate Jurisdiction. 0 3 But neither scholarly commentary
nor the Supreme Court supports this position.74 More importantly, the
Founding Fathers contradicted this opinion in The Federalist,75 the ratification
debates,76 and their other writings.77
In sum, the Constitution condones bills like those recently before the
108th Congress and now before the 109th Congress. As jurisdiction and
judicial power differ, these bills do not erode anything the Constitution gives to
the courts. The cases that the bills cover are in the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. Thus, Article IlI explicitly allows Congress to make "exceptions"
so that the Court cannot hear them.
69. See infra Part III.C (surveying debates over the Exceptions Clause and showing
concerns for jury trial).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (setting forth the Exceptions Clause). As the
Exceptions Clause applies to the appellate jurisdiction, it follows that Congress cannot make
exceptions to the Court's original jurisdiction. See also supra note 50 and accompanying text
(discussing nature of Supreme Court's original jurisdiction).
71. NoAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed.,
Foundation for American Christian Education 1983) (1828) (defining "regulation").
72. Id. (defining "exception").
73. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see Velasco, supra note 13, at 720 (summarizing this
argument); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VIL. L.
REv. 900, 913 (1981-82) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional Power] (same).
74. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 720 n.242 (noting scholarly rejection of this
argument); Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 73, at 914-15 (critiquing this argument
historically using Supreme Court precedent and linguistically).
75. See, e.g., infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (showing that The Federalist
contradicts this).
76. See, e.g., infra notes 218-29 and accompanying text (showing that the ratification
debates contradict this).
77. See, e.g., infra notes 230-38 and accompanying text (showing that the Founders'
writings contradict this).
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B. Foundational Principles
Besides the Constitution's text, its foundational principles indicate that
Congress controls the federal courts' jurisdiction. The Founding Fathers'
writings and debates highlight the principles embodied in the Constitution,
principles that are consistent with Congress limiting federal courts' jurisdiction
through laws like those proposed in the 108th and 109th Congresses.
Furthermore, their debates and writings clarify "the sense in which the
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. 7 8 According to Madison,
The Federalist and the ratification debates play an essential role in interpreting
ambiguous provisions of the Constitution. 79 They illustrate the mindset of the
Founders and put the Constitution in its historical context.80  The author
concedes that examining the Constitution's "legislative history" can be like
looking "over the cocktail party to identify your friends."''  Thus, this subpart
examines the Constitution's friends and foes in order to get a balanced
82perspective. It surveys the Constitutional Convention, the ratification
conventions, The Federalist, Anti-Federalist authors, and the Founders' private
78. 9 JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)
[hereinafter MADISON, WRITINGS], quoted in DAvID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS,
THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION 22.
79. See 9 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 78, at 72, reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note
63, at 74 (noting the value of ratification debates in constitutional interpretation); Id. at 219,
quoted in BARTON, supra note 78, at 254 (calling The Federalist "the most authentic exposition
of the heart of the federal Constitution"). Some may argue that The Federalist simply represents
political propaganda rather than constitutional exposition. Even if this were true (and the
"Father of the Constitution" therefore was wrong), The Federalist still represents the popular
understanding of the Constitution. Hence, it shows what the people and ratifiers thought the
Constitution meant when they ratified it. In order to demean The Federalist as partisan
propaganda, one must argue that the Constitution had a secret meaning which none of the
people or ratifiers recognized in the late 1700s and which modem courts can now conjure.
80. See 4 THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 373 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., Boston, Gray & Bowen
1830) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, MEMOIR], quotedin BARTON, supra note 78, at 22 (noting that the
Constitution should be interpreted in the sense it was written).
81. Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005), http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343
BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument
(quoting Justice Breyer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. Compare infra Part III.B-D. 1 (consulting debates in the Constitutional Convention,
the ratification debates, The Federalist, Anti-Federalist authors, the private writings of the
Founders, and legislation from the first Congress to discern the Founders' intent) with Theodore
1. Weiman, Comment, Jurisdiction Stripping, Constitutional Supremacy, and the Implications
ofEx Parte Young, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1677, 1690-91 (2005) (trying to construe the Founders'
intent after citing only four Founders).
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writings to show that the Exceptions Clause naturally grows out of the
Constitution's foundational principles.
1. Separation of Powers & Checks and Balances
The Founding Fathers believed that the principle of checks and balances
tempered the separation of powers. Not content with dividing power, they
balanced power against power to keep the government inside its limits. In this
way, these principles compliment each other.
The private writings of the Founders illustrate this. They did not give any
governmental body unlimited power. James Iredell stated that "unlimited
power... was not to be trusted without the most imminent danger, to any man
or body of men on earth, '8 3 and Roger Sherman agreed. 84 Far from trusting
men in power, Jefferson wanted to "bind [them] down from mischief by the
chains of the Constitution.8 5 To prevent any single branch from gaining
unlimited power, the Founders divided power among the three branches.86 As
Madison noted, separating power was not enough; each branch had to keep the
others from "overleap[ing] the great barrier which defends the rights of the
people. 87 John Jay connected the two principles:
83. 2 G.J. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 145-46 (New York,
Appleton 1857-58), quoted in RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 311 n.19 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
BERGER, GOVERNMENT].
84. Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven, Letter II, NEW HAVEN GAZETrE (Dec. 25,
1788) [hereinafter Sherman, Citizen 11], in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTrrUTION: WRITINGS OF THE
"OTHER" FEDERALISTS, 1787-1788, at 263,270 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds.,
1998) [hereinafter FRIENDS] ("Every department and officer of the federal government will be
subject to the regulation and control of the laws....").
85. 4 JONATHAN ELLIOTr, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Company 1888).
86. See 6 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 6-8,429-31 (Charles Francis Adams
ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1850-56), reprinted in I FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 59, 137
(noting the need to separate powers and how the Constitution divides legislative power among
the House, Senate, and President (not the judiciary)).
87. James Madison, A Memorial andRemonstrance Presented to the General Assembly of
the State of Virginia at Their Session in 1785 in Consequence of a Bill Brought into that
Assemblyfor the Establishment of Religion 4-5 (Massachusetts, Isaiah Thomas 1786), quoted in
BARTON, supra note 78, at 272; see also 10 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
207-15 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962-77) [hereinafter MADISON, PAPERS], reprinted
in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 647 (noting that the goal of government is to give it enough
power to protect citizens but also to control that power so that the government does not invade
citizen's rights).
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To vest legislative, judicial, and executive powers in one and the same
body of men, and that, too, in a body daily changing its members, can never
be wise. In my opinion, these three great departments of sovereignty
should be forever separated, and so distributed as to serve as checks on
each other.
8 8
Washington thought it wise to include "reciprocal checks" by "dividing and
distributing [power] into different depositories."8 9 Charles Carroll praised the
Constitution for "so distribut[ing] powers among the parts composing it, that
each may control the others."90 Thus, the Founders viewed the separation of
powers and checks and balances as opposite sides of the same coin.
The Federalist reinforces the connection between the principles of checks
and balances and separation of powers. Calling it an "essential precaution in
favor of liberty,"91 Madison summarized Montesquieu's principle of separation
of powers:
[Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments ought to have no
partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His
meaning... can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power
of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution are subverted.92
In other words, he and Montesquieu advocated a system of shared powers
where each branch partially controlled the others but no branch completely
controlled the actions of another.93  Madison saw the folly of trusting
"parchment barriers" to restrain power.94 Like Jefferson, he envisioned a
system where no branch could exceed its limits "without being effectually
checked and restrained by the others."95 Hence, "a mere demarcation on
88. 3 JOHN JAY, THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 210 (Henry P.
Johnston ed., New York, Burt Franklin 1890) [hereinafter JAY, CORRESPONDENCE]; see also id.
at 388-89 (noting that the Constitution combines both principles).
89. George Washington, Address of George Washington, President of the United States,
and Late Commander in Chief of the American Army, to the People of the United States,
Preparatory to His Declination 22 (Baltimore, George & Henry S. Keatinge 1796), quoted in
BARTON, supra note 78, at 271.
90. 2 KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF CHARLES CARROLL OF CARROLLTON 1737-
1882 WITH HIS CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS 210 (New York& London, G.P. Putnam's
Sons 1898) [hereinafter ROWLAND, LIFE].
91. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 8, at 321 (James Madison).
92. Id. at 323.
93. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 8, at 330 (James Madison) (showing that the
branches are blended so that each checks the powers of the others).
94. Id. at 331.
95. Id. at 333.
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parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a
sufficient guard" against the concentration ofpower.96 The way to prevent such
concentration "consists in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of
the others. 9 7 Hamilton agreed that dividing power works only if combined
with checks and balances; thus, the Constitution gave each branch
"constitutional arms" for its "effectual power of self-defence. 9 8
The Constitutional Convention also shows this commitment to the
separation of powers as well as checks and balances. James Wilson, James
Madison, and George Mason99 favored the Council of Revision, which would
have extended the veto to the Supreme Court.100 They argued that this would
allow the Court to strike down constitutional laws that were unwise.'0 '
Elbridge Gerry responded that judges sufficiently checked the legislature by
deciding constitutional questions, 10 2 and he opposed making judges into
legislators. 0 3  By voting down the Council four times, the Convention
emphasized the difference between legislative and judicial power.'
4
The ratification conventions also illustrate how the Founders wove
separation of powers together with checks and balances. In Pennsylvania,
James Wilson observed the Constitution keeps the branches "nearly
independent and distinct."' 0 5 However, "in the very construction of this
96. Id. at 335.
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 8, at 347 (James Madison); see also id. at 347-49
(noting that the Constitution made "ambition... counteract ambition" in order "to control the
abuses of government" through the three branches and federalism).
98. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 8, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (remarking on
the "insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation" and the need for each branch to have
"constitutional and effectual power of self-defence").
99. See BARTON, supra note 78, at 269 (calling these men the Convention's three most
influential members).
100. See 2 MADISON, PAPERS, supra note 87, at 1161-62, quoted in BARTON, supra note
78, at 268-69 (recounting Wilson's description of the Council).
101. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing further the Council of
Revision).
102. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter FARRAND 1937], reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 320 (stating that
Judiciary's constitutional review restrained Congress enough).
103. See 2 MADISON, PAPERS, supra note 87, at 1162-66, quoted in BARTON, supra note
78, at 269 (stating that such mixing should never happen and noting Strong's and Martin's
agreement).
104. See id. at 791, 812, 1171, and 1331, cited in BARTON, supra note 78, at 269
(recording the Council's four defeats at the Constitutional Convention).
105. 2 ELLIOTT, supra note 85, at 479.
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government, there are numerous checks," some expressly enumerated and some
not.106 In New York, Hamilton noted that the Constitution incorporates
"mutual checks." l0 7  In Virginia, Patrick Henry strongly opposed any
unrestrained power.'08 In North Carolina, Iredell praised the Constitution for
melding the two principles because separating powers would be useless "if each
power had no means to defend itself against the encroachment of the others."' 09
In sum, separation of powers means that one branch cannot take over all
the functions of another, but checks and balances means that each branch must
have tools of self-defense against the encroachments of the others. The
Exceptions Clause exemplifies this principle because it gives Congress a way to
limit judicial excess without completely controlling the courts. The courts have
judicial review for their defense; the Exceptions Clause levels the field for
Congress.
2. Majority Rule & Legislative Preeminence
The Founding Fathers also relied heavily on the foundational principle of
majority rule, and thus, they envisioned the legislature as the preeminent
branch. 0 The Constitutional Convention reflected this. Supporters of the ill-
fated Council of Revision wanted the Court to judge the wisdom of laws, not
just their constitutionality."' Gerry objected because "[ilt was quite foreign
from the nature of [the] office to make them judges of the policy of public
measures." 12 By rejecting the Council, the Founders restricted the judiciary's
role and gave Congress the broader duty of weighing the wisdom of legislation.
The Federalist also highlights the Founders' belief in majority rule and
legislative preeminence. Madison argued that requiring more than a majority
for a quorum would reverse a "fundamental principle of free government"
106. James Wilson, Speech, Pennsylvania Convention, 4 December 1787, morning, in
FRIENDS, supra note 84, 231, 233.
107. 2 ELLIOTT, supra note 85, at 347.
108. See 3 ELLIOTr, supra note 85, at 436 (opposing unrestrained power); see also id. at
563 (noting Grayson's agreement).
109. 4 ELLIOTT, supra note 85, at 74.
110. The author is not implying that Founders favored direct democracy. One must view
this principle in light of the others. To the extent that they trusted government at all, the
Founders viewed the legislature most favorably.
11. See supra note 101 and infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (explaining
supporters' positions).
112. 1 FARRAND 1937, supra note 102, at 97,reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS',supranote 63, at
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because "[i]t would be no longer the majority that would rule; the power would
be transferred to the minority."'"1 3  He observed that "[t]he legislative
department derives a superiority in our governments" partly because its more
ambiguous limits indicate that the Founders had greater trust in it than the other
two branches."14 Although this created the threat of a tyrannical majority, he
saw only two antidotes. One was to set up an authority that was independent of
the majority, but he dismissed this idea as dangerous to both the majority and
the minority." 5 Instead, the Founders preferred to include so many interests
and classes in society that they could not form a cohesive majority on a wide
range of issues.' 16 In short, "[i]n republican government, the legislative
authority necessarily predominates.""17
The ratification debates further illustrate the Founders' confidence in
majority rule and legislative preeminence. In Massachusetts, Fisher Ames
defended representative government by saying: "The people must govern by a
majority, with whom all power resides." 18 In Connecticut, Ellsworth conceded
that the courts restrained Congress on constitutional issues, but he concluded:
"In republics, it is a fundamental principle that the majority govern, and that the
minority comply with the general voice."1 9 In Pennsylvania, James Wilson
raised the specter of the tyranny of the majority but dismissed it as completely
impossible. 1
20
Many of the Constitution's foes argued that the judiciary removed too
much power from Congress. Federal Farmer, an Anti-Federalist pseudonym,
argued that despite the limits on courts, judges would thwart Congress and
destroy liberty through "their interpretations."' 21 Brutus, another pseudonym,
113. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, supra note 8, at 395 (James Madison); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 8, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (calling majority rule the
"fundamental maxim of republican government").
114. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 8, at 332 (James Madison).
115. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 8, at 350 (James Madison) (calling this
solution at best "a precarious security").
116. See id. (noting that the multiplicity of interests in the nation better prevented
majoritarian abuses).
117. 1dat348.
118. Fisher Ames, Speech, Massachusetts Convention, 15 January 1788, in FRIENDS, supra
note 84, at 196, 197.
119. 2 ELLIoTr, supra note 85, at 196-97.
120. See 2 ELLIOTT, supra note 85, at 495 (recording Wilson's discussion of possible
majoritarian abuses).
121. FEDERAL FARMER No. 15, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANT-FEDERALIST 185 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1981) [hereinafter STORING], reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra
note 63, at 232.
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feared that the judiciary would control Congress by guiding it to expand
congressional powers. 22 He argued that the Constitution placed the judiciary
higher than Congress:
But the judges under this constitution will controul the legislature, for the
supreme court are authorized in the last resort, to determine what is the
extent of the powers of the Congress; they are to give the constitution an
explanation, and there is no power above them to set aside their
judgment.1
23
That is, they thought the Constitution granted the judiciary supreme and
unrestrained power, power which elevated it above Congress. Hence, even the
Constitution's foes thought the legislature was the more trustworthy, and
should be the more preeminent, branch.
The Founders' other writings confirm their faith in majority rule and
legislative preeminence. James Wilson not only recounted the Revolutionary-
era disdain for the executive and judicial powers,124 but he also recollected that
"our assemblies were chosen by ourselves: they were the guardians of our
rights, the objects of our confidence, and the anchor of our political hopes."1
25
To his chagrin, under the Constitution, the people still treated the executive and
judiciary as "stepmothers" while throwing "every good and precious gift" into
the lap of the legislature. 26 While he endorsed the Court's ability to invalidate
unconstitutional laws, he declared that this did not elevate the Court above the
Congress. 27 In 1788, Madison noted that the Founders neither intended to
make the judiciary superior to Congress nor thought this was proper, 28 a
sentiment even Hamilton shared.
29
122. See BRUTUS, No. 12, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 146-54, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 236 (arguing that the judiciary would allow Congress to expand
its powers).
123. BRUTUS No. 15, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 186-89, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS',
supra note 63, at 239.
124. See 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 292-93 (Robert Green
McCloskey ed., 1967) [hereinafter WILSON, WORKS], reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63,
at 71-72 (stating that the executive and judicial branches were the objects of "aversion and
distrust").
125. Id., reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 71-72.
126. Id., reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 71-72.
127. See id. at 326-31, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS',supra note 63, at 254 ("[Judicial review]
does not confer upon the judicial department a power superior, in its general nature, to that of
the legislature . . ").
128. See 11 MADISON, PAPERS, supra note 87, at 293, reprinted in I FOUNDERS', supra note
63, at 652 (noting that judicial review's timing can elevate the judiciary over Congress, "which
was never intended, and can never be proper").
129. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 8, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Nor does
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In sum, the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist, and the ratification
debates indicate that the Founders created a government grounded on the
principle of majority rule. Even their private writings and the Constitution's
opponents confirm this. Because they relied so heavily on majority rule, almost
all leaders during the Founding era viewed the legislature as the preeminent and
predominant branch of government. This principle is consistent with
Congress's Exceptions Clause power as illustrated in the current bills because
the Clause gives Congress a way to assert itself when the judiciary goes too far.
If Congress really is the preeminent branch, it must have some way to respond
to the courts.'
30
3. Judicial Skepticism
While they believed that the judiciary must be independent and that it
served as a check on legislative abuses, 13 the Founding Fathers did not place
great trust in the third branch. They illustrated this third foundational principle,
skepticism toward the judiciary, in four ways.
a. Weaker than Congress
First, the Founders emphasized that the judiciary was less powerful than
Congress. In the Constitutional Convention, Mason and Wilson wanted courts
to invalidate unwise laws, not just unconstitutional ones. 132 But even they
realized that without the Council of Revision, federal courts had to execute
Congress's will unless it was "plainly" unconstitutional. 133 Madison contended
that "notwithstanding this co-operation of the two departments [executive and
judiciary], the Legislature would still be an overmatch for them.' 34 Hence, he
Uudicial review] by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power.").
130. Some may argue that this statement contradicts the separation of powers. But as it
simply involves pitting power against power, it is entirely consistent with the twin principles of
separation of powers and checks and balances. See supra Part III.B. 1 (explaining how the
principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances interact).
131. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 96 (Harvey Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835) (observing that the judiciary's allegiance to the
Constitution restrains the legislature).
132. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (noting the limited nature ofjudicial
review).
133. 2 FARRAND 1937, supra note 102, at 78, reprinted in I FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at
322.
134. Id. at 74, reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 322.
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clearly did not think the Supreme Court alone surpassed Congress. However,
the Convention voted this plan down repeatedly, thus showing that they did not
give the judiciary any legislative role.
The Anti-Federalists insisted that the judiciary would overwhelm
Congress. 135  Martin and Gerry opposed the Constitution partly for this
reason. 136 Brutus thought the independence of federal judges made them
uncontrollable. 137 He later warned that judges would control Congress by
defining the extent of its powers in constitutional decisions that no branch
could set aside.
138
The Federalist argued the opposite. Hamilton defended judicial review
against "an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the
judiciary to the legislative power."'139 He wrote that judicial review was
necessary to restrain Congress, but it did not "by any means suppose a
superiority of the judicial to the legislative power."' 140  Though necessary,
judicial review did not elevate the judiciary above Congress.
Other advocates of the Constitution confirmed this. Gouverneur Morris
wrote that federal judges "will never be so wild, so absurd, so mad as to pretend
that they are superior to the legislative power of America."' 14' Madison later
reflected that because laws come before the judiciary last, judicial review
"makes the Judiciary [Department] paramount in fact to the Legislature, which
was never intended, and can never be proper."'142 After explaining how the
judiciary checks Congress, James Wilson observed:
This regulation is far from throwing any disparagement upon the legislative
authority of the United States. It does not confer upon the judicial
department a power superiour, in its general nature to that of the legislature;
135. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1576
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833) [hereinafter STORY, COMMENTARIES], reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 202 (summarizing arguments against the judiciary).
136. See I ELLIOTr, supra note 85, at 380 (warning that the federal courts would become
the sole tribunal for constitutional questions); id. at 493 (warning that the federal courts would
become oppressive).
137. See BRUTUS No.. 11, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 130-38, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 235 (stating that federal judges are rendered "totally independent"
and uncorrectable).
138. See BRUTUS No. 15, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 186-89, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 239 (arguing that the Court would eventually control Congress).
139. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 8, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton).
140. Id. at 523.
141. HOWARD SWiGGETr, THE EXTRAORDNARY MR. MORRIS 362 (1952), quoted in
BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at 383 n.22.
142. 11 MADISON, PAPERS, supra note 87, at 285-93, reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note
63, at 652.
1160
JURISDICTION WITHDRAWAL
but it confers upon it, in particular instances, and for particular purposes,
the power of declaring and enforcing the superiour power of the
constitution-the supreme law of the land.
143
Whatever the nature of judicial review,144 the Founders never placed the
judiciary over Congress.
b. Weakest Branch
Second, the Founders thought that the judiciary should be the weakest
branch. The Anti-Federalists objected to the Constitution because they thought
the judiciary was too powerful. Brutus thought the judges were too
independent:
[Rather than following the British concept of judicial independence, the
authors of the Constitution] have made the judges independent, in the
fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to controul any of
their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they
cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are
independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under
heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves
independent of heaven itself. 1
45
He advised caution when setting the scope of judicial power because judicial
errors were far less public than congressional ones and because the judges'
independence rendered them far less accountable. '4 Clearly these opponents
did not view the courts with a friendly eye.
In response, The Federalist highlighted the judiciary's weakness. 
147
Madison insisted that the danger of judicial excess was extremely remote
because the limits on the judiciary were so clear that "projects of usurpation...
143. 1 WILSON, WORKS, supra note 124, at326-31, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note
63, at 254.
144. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACrIvIsM: BuLwARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS
SECuRrrY? 5-32 (1997) (distinguishing different types ofjudicial review throughout history).
145. BRUTUS No. 15, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 189-92, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS',
supra note 63, at 141.
146. See FEDERAL FARMER No. 15, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 185, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 233 (arguing that the individualized and specialized nature of the
judiciary is a great danger).
147. See also I JAMES MONROE, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 384-87 (Stanislaus
Murray Hamilton ed., New York & London, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1898-1903) [hereinafter
MONROE, WRITINGS], reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 251 (disproving charges that
the federal courts would be "the great instrument of tyranny" by showing that they were not as
powerful as alleged).
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would immediately betray and defeat themselves."' 148 The judiciary was so
weak that when he discussed the limits on Congress, he mentioned only its
bicameral nature and the president's veto. 49 He refused to "creat[e] a will in
the community independent of the majority" to prevent the tyranny of the
majority because this "at best, is but a precarious security" that would endanger
the rights of the majority and minority. 50 Hamilton also minimized the power
of the "least dangerous branch":
The judiciary... has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE
nor wILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.151
He agreed with Montesquieu that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the
weakest of the three departments of power" and noted that "liberty can have
nothing to fear from the judiciary alone."'' 52 Hence, even the Constitution's
prime defenders did not view the judiciary favorably.
In the ratification conventions, the Constitution's opponents confirmed
that the judiciary should be the weakest branch. They reiterated charges that
the Constitution made the judiciary too powerful. For example, Luther Martin
maintained that the federal courts had too much power because the
constitutionality of all laws "rests only with the judges ... to determine." 153 In
New York, Thomas Treadwell argued that the Constitution "departed widely
from the principles and political faith of '76" partly because "the powers of the
judiciary may be extended to any degree short of almighty."'154 By objecting
strongly to a judiciary they perceived as too powerful, they confirmed that it
should be the weakest branch.
In response to these arguments at the ratification debates, the
Constitution's supporters emphasized that the judiciary was the weakest branch
of the three. Madison argued that the Anti-Federalists' fears were unfounded
because the limits on Congress also limited the judiciary. 55 He summarized:
148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 8, at 332 (James Madison).
149. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 8, at 348-49 (James Madison) (discussing the
limits on Congress without mentioning the courts).
150. Id. at 350.
151. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 8, at 520 (Alexander Hamilton).
152. Id. at 521.
153. 1 ELLIOTT, supra note 85, at 380.
154. 2 ELLIOTr, supra note 85, at 401.
155. See 3 ELLIOTr, supra note 85, at 530, 534 (saying that Mason's fears of an all-
expansive judiciary were "groundless" and explaining how limits on Congress also limited the
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"Were I to select a power which might be given with confidence, it would be
judicial power. This power cannot be abused, without raising the indignation
of all the people of the states."156 That is, the judiciary was too weak to abuse
its powers.
Even early observers of America noticed that the judiciary was the
weakest branch. After he outlined how the federal courts might threaten state
power, Alexis de Tocqueville acknowledged that this threat was not great:
"Federal judges feel the relative weakness of the power in the name of which
they act, and they are closer to abandoning a right ofjurisdiction in cases where
the law gives it to them than being inclined to claim it illegally."'
157
c. Distrust of Judicial Discretion
Third, the Founders indicated their skepticism through their distrust of
judicial discretion. The Constitutional Convention debates over the Council of
Revision illustrate this. Mason noted the strict limits on judges' discretion:
"They could declare an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every law
however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly under this
description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to give it a free
course." 158 James Wilson agreed: "Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may
be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet be not so unconstitutional as to
justify the Judge in refusing to give them effect."' 59 The Convention declined
to relax these limits with the Council of Revision. Rufus King declared:
"[T]he judges must interpret the laws; they ought not to be legislators."'
' 60
Sherman likewise "disapproved of Judges meddling in politics.'
16' In sum, the
Founders voted the Council down repeatedly in order to limit or eliminate
judicial discretion.
The Anti-Federalist authors thought that federal judges had too much
flexibility to "constitutionalize" their personal preferences. Justice Story
summarized one main objection:
courts).
156. Id. at 535.
157. DE TOCQUEViLLE, supra note 131, at 134-35.
158. 2 FARRAND 1937, supra note 102, at 78, reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at
323.
159. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND 1911], quoted in BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at 323.
160. 1 FARRAND 1911,supra note 159, at 108, quoted in BARTON, supra note 78, at 259.
161. Id. at 299, quoted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 323.
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The power of construing the laws according to the spirit of the constitution
will enable that court to mould them into whatever shape, it may think
proper; especially, as its decisions will not be in any manner subject to the
revision and correction of the legislative body. This is as unprecedented, as
it is dangerous. 162
Federal Farmer feared that judges would abuse their interpretive powers "for
changing the nature of the government."' 63 Despite the limits on the courts, he
thought the Constitution left a "vast deal to the discretion and interpretation-to
the wisdom, integrity, and politics of the judges.' 64 This discretion posed
particular danger because, unlike legislative abuses, only the parties to a case,
their neighbors, and a "few professional men" would detect judicial ones. 165
Brutus feared that as the federal courts could decide constitutional questions "in
equity," they would "explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit
of it, without being confined to the words or letter."' 66 This gave judges vast,
unchecked discretion:
They will give the sense of every article of the constitution, that may from
time to time come before them. And in their decisions they will not confine
themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according
to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution. The
opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will have the force of
law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can correct
their errors, or controul their adjudications.
67
To discover the spirit of the Constitution, judges would use the vague phrases
of the Preamble or the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify federal intrusion
into local matters that the Constitution did not delegate to the federal
government. 68 In sum, these critics thought judges had too much discretion to
implement their preferences rather than the Constitution's text.
162. 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 135, § 1576, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra
note 63, at 202.
163. FEDERAL FARMER No. 15, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 185, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 232.
164. Id., in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 185, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at
232.
165. See id, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 185, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS',supra note
63, at 233 (contrasting the quick discovery and "general alarm" of legislative abuses with the
private nature ofjudicial ones).
166. BRUTUS No. 11, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 130-38, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS',
supra note 63, at 235.
167. Id, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 130-38, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note
63, at 236.
168. See BRUTUS No. 12, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 146-54, reprinted in 1
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 237 (predicting that courts would expand federal power using the
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The Federalist underscores the Founders' distrust for judicial discretion
and their desire for a limited judiciary. While addressing the tyranny of the
majority, Madison dismissed the idea of"creating a will.. . independent of the
majority" as nothing more than "a precarious security" because it "may as well
espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor
party, and may possibly be turned against both parties."'169 It is hardly likely
that he would then give large amounts of discretion to unelected judges, judges
who personify the "will... independent of the majority.' 170 Hamilton rebutted
charges that federal judges would have unfettered discretion by interpreting the
Constitution according to its spirit: "In the first place, there is not a syllable in
[the Constitution] which directly empowers the national courts to construe the
laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or which gives them any greater
latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every 
State.' 7'
Such power would "enable the court to mold them [the laws] into whatever
shape it may think proper" which was "as unprecedented as it was
dangerous."7 2 Later Hamilton noted that just as the Constitution limits the
powers of Congress, it also sets the outer boundaries of the federal courts'
powers. The courts have no discretion to hear cases outside those 
limits. 73
The writings of other Founders confirm their skeptical attitude toward
judicial discretion. Jefferson's distrust was especially vehement:
The germ of dissolution of our federal government is in... the federal
judiciary; an irresponsible body (for impeachment is hardly a scare-crow)
working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little today and a little
tomorrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief, over the field of
jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the States.
174
At another time, he remarked that the lawgiver should be merciful, but the
judge should be "a mere machine."' 75  Justice Story referred to courts of.
Preamble and the Necessary and Proper Clause).
169. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 8, at 350 (James Madison).
170. Id.
171. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 8, at 541 (Alexander Hamilton) (addressing
fears that equity jurisdiction would place the judiciary over Congress).
172. See id. (summarizing objections to the federal courts' equity jurisdiction); see also id.
at 544 (explaining that judicial encroachments on the legislature were a "phantom").
173. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 8, at 558 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that
the Constitution limits congressional and judicial power by enumerating the powers of each
body).
174. 25 THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRriNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 331-32 (Albert E. Bergh ed.,
1903-04) [hereinafter JEFFERSON, WRITINGS].
175. 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 505 (Charles T. Cullen ed.,
1983).
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unbounded jurisdiction as "the most formidable instrument of arbitrary power,
that could well be devised."' 176 He also disapproved of judicial innovations
because the Constitution should "have a fixed, uniform, permanent
construction"; it should be "not dependent upon the passions or parties of
particular times, but the same yesterday, today, and forever.' 77 James Wilson
once instructed a judge to "remember, that his duty and his business is, not to
make the law but to interpret and apply it.",178  This was a limited, non-
discretionary role. Charles Carroll noted that giving judges "a discretionary
power" was "incompatible with the spirit of our constitution.' 79 If this was
true when he referred to Britain's unwritten constitution, it is all the more true
for a written one. 18 Later he remarked that "a free constitution will not endure
discretionary powers."'
8'
.The ratification debates further underscore this distrust of judicial
discretion. Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution gave judges too much
discretion, while Federalists countered that the Anti-Federalists overstated
reality. In Virginia, for example, Patrick Henry thought the federal courts were
either impractical or "dangerous in the extreme.1 8 2 Grayson protested because
Supreme Court decisions were unreviewable.18 3 He argued that equity and
federal question jurisdiction gave the Supreme Court "more power than any
court under heaven. One set ofjudges ought not to have this power."' 84 John
Marshall defended federal jurisdiction because the Constitution's limits on
Congress's power also limited the courts' federal question jurisdiction. 8 5 The
judiciary had no power to surpass these limits. 8 6 In sum, no one on either side
or at any stage of the constitutional debate placed confidence in judicial
discretion.
176. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 9
(5th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1905), quoted in BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at
304 (referring to jurisdiction "arising from natural law and justice").
177. Id. § 426, quoted in BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at 381.
178. 2 WILSON, WORKS, supra note 124, at 502, quoted in BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra
note 83, at 19 n.2.
179. See 1 ROWLAND, LIFE, supra note 90, at 344 (referring to the British constitution).
180. See William Cranch, 1 Cranch iii (1804), quoted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at
188 (noting that a government of laws should leave "the least possible range" for judicial
discretion).
181. 1 ROWLAND, LIFE, supra note 90, at 349.
182. 3 ELLIOTr, supra note 85, at 539.
183. Id. at 563 (objecting to judiciary because "recurrence can only be had to the sword").
184. Id. at 564-65.
185. See id. at 553 (explaining that limits on Congress also limit the courts).
186. See id. (arguing that neither the courts nor Congress can go beyond their limits).
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d. Neither Guardian of Rights Nor Ultimate Arbiter of Constitution
Fourth, the Founders illustrated their distrust of the judiciary by not
placing any confidence in judges' ability to act either as the guardian of
individual rights or as the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."
'1 87
Although the judiciary checked Congress, the Founders did not see it as the
primary protection for minorities. Madison specifically rejected creating "a will
in the community independent of the majority" because it endangered both the
majority and minority. 188 Instead, he thought that the diversity of the nation,
the "multiplicity of interests," and the "multiplicity of sects" would prevent a
tyrannical majority. 189 To John Dickinson, the people were the ultimate check
against constitutional abuses. 190 Roger Sherman wrote that federalism
protected individual rights: "The immediate security of the civil and domestic
rights of the people will be in the government of the particular states.'
91
Gerry, who supported judicial review, opposed the Council of Revision because
"[i]t was making Statesmen of the Judges; and setting them up as the guardians
of the Rights of the people. He relied for his part on the Representatives of the
people as the guardians of their Rights & interests." 192
The Anti-Federalists feared that the Court would become the ultimate
arbiter of the Constitution. The Federal Farmer criticized the Constitution
because "the judges and juries, in their interpretations .... have a very
extensive influence for preserving or destroying liberty, and for changing the
nature of the government."' 193 Luther Martin objected because he thought that
federal judges would become the exclusive mouthpiece of the Constitution.'
94
187. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (referring to Supreme Court as
"ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969)
(same); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating that "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").
188. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 8, at 350 (James Madison).
189. Id. at 350-51.
190. John Dickinson, The Letters, in FRIENDS, supra note 84, at 218 (noting that the people
guard the Constitution).
191. Sherman, Citizen II, supra note 84, in FRIENDS, supra note 84, at 266-67. See id. at
268-69 (noting that states check the federal government).
192. 2 FARRAND 1937, supra note 102, at 74, reprinted in 1 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at
322; see also BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at 323 n.8 (noting that Gerry represented
the majority view); id. at 384 n.29 (noting John Marshall's agreement).
193. FEDERAL FARMER No. 15, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 185, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 232.
194. See Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 89-
92, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 234 (predicting that the federal courts' reach
would expand greatly).
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Hence, in order to conclude that the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of the
Constitution, one must adopt the interpretation of its foes, not the one of those
who wrote and advocated it.
While the judiciary does interpret the law, the Founders did not see this as
an exclusively judicial role. Madison refuted the notion that only the Court
could interpret the Constitution:
I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of government, that the exposition of
the laws and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary. But I beg to know
upon what principle it can be contended that any one department draws
from the Constitution greater powers than another in marking out the limits
of the powers of the several departments.1
95
Later he summarized this point: "Nothing has yet been offered to invalidate the
doctrine that the meaning of the Constitution may as well be ascertained by the
Legislative as by the Judicial authority."'196  John Randolph confirmed
Madison's opinion, 97 as did Jefferson.198 Jefferson spoke strongly against
making the Supreme Court the voice of the Constitution: "You seem ... to
consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions; a
very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the
despotism of an oligarchy.... The Constitution has erected no such single
tribunal."' 99 He rejected this role for the courts because it made the unelected
branch supreme and transformed the Constitution into "a mere thing of wax in
the hands of the Judiciary which they may twist and shape into any form theyplease. ,200
The Founders also did not place tremendous trust in a judge's insight,
temperament, or wisdom. Nathaniel Gorham opposed the Council of Revision
because he saw no "advantage of employing Judges in this way. As Judges
they are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere
policy of public measures. 20 ' Luther Martin declared: "A knowledge of
195. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 520 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834), quoted in BARTON, supra note
78, at 264.
196. Id. at 568, quoted in BARTON, supra note 78, at 265.
197. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 661 (Gales & Seaton ed., 1851), quoted in BARTON, supra note
78, at 265 (noting that Congress is equally qualified to interpret the Constitution as the Court).
198. 15 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 174, at 215, quoted inBARTON, supra note 78, at
265 (stating that each branch "has equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty under the
Constitution").
199. Id. at 277, quoted in BARTON, supra note 78, at 266.
200. 4 JEFFERSON, MEMOIR, supra note 80, at 215, quoted in BARTON, supra note 78, at
265-66.
201. 2 FARRAN 1911, supra note 159, at 73, quoted in BERGER, GOvERNmENT, supra note
83, at 323.
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mankind and of legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong in a higher
degree to the Judges than to the Legislature. '" 20 2 Jefferson observed that judges
are subject to the same pressures and biases as other officials because they are
merely "as honest as other men and not more so."20 3 Even the Council's
supporters, Mason and Wilson, recognized the limits on judicial review and
stated that courts could not strike down legislation for policy reasons.2°
In sum, the Founding generation viewed the judiciary with great
skepticism. Not only did they view it as weaker than Congress, but they
intended that it remain the weakest branch. Both friends and foes of the
Constitution wanted to curtail or eliminate all judicial discretion, especially
over constitutional issues. As a natural result, neither side entrusted the
judiciary with the task of protecting individual liberties or of exclusively
interpreting the Constitution.
These foundational principles all support Congress's power over federal
court jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause. First, checks and balances
requires that each branch have a way to restrain the others. Thus, Congress
must have a way to restrain the courts.20 5 As the Founding Fathers saw the
legislature as preeminent, they would not have subjected its decisions to the
unfettered discretion of the least-trusted branch. Furthermore, because they
vehemently opposed unlimited power, they would not have freed the weakest
branch from all effective oversight. As they opposed judicial discretion and did
not view the courts as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, they must
have left the other branches weapons for their constitutional "self-defence.
'
,
206
Rather than trusting the "parchment barriers" of the Constitution to prevent
judicial expansion, these principles show that the Founders must have given
Congress another way to check the judiciary.0 7 While not completely
dispositive, these foundational principles indicate that Congress can limit the
federal courts' jurisdiction as the 108th and 109th Congresses have
proposed.2 °8
202. 2 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1166 (Henry D. Gilpin ed.,
Washington, D.C., Langtree & O'Sullivan 1840), quoted in BARTON, supra note 78, at 264.
203. 15 JEFFERSON, WRITINGS, supra note 174, at 277, quoted in BARTON, supra note 78, at
266.
204. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (noting limits on judicial review).
205. See infra notes 522-26 and accompanying text (showing that appointments,
amendments, and appellate reversal do not constitute this check).
206. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 8, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton).
207. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 8, at 331 (James Madison).
208. See supra Part II (outlining the recent and current legislation).
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C. The Founding Fathers & The Exceptions Clause
Not only do the Constitution's text and foundational principles indicate
that Congress can limit the federal courts' jurisdiction, but the Founders also
explicitly stated that the Exceptions Clause gave Congress this power. Their
statements confirm once again that the Constitution condones the proposals
pending before Congress.20 9
The Anti-Federalist authors gave the Exceptions Clause mixed reviews.
Brutus agreed that it allowed Congress to remove cases from the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction.210  But he saw it as an "admission that the
[judicial] power itself is improper without restraint., 211 The Federal Farmer
commented that "it is impossible to say how far congress may, with propriety,
extend their regulations in this respect., 212 They agreed that Congress could
make exceptions, but they doubted that it actually would.
The Federalist displays the Founders' intent that Congress limit the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction via Article III, Section 2. Hamilton
wrote that if parts of the judicial power ever caused problems, Congress had
"ample authority to make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations" as
would "remove these inconveniences. '" 21 3 Furthermore, if a case was not within
the Court's narrow original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court had "nothing more
than an appellate jurisdiction, 'with such exceptions and under such regulations
as the Congress shall make.' 214 Thus, he argued that the Supreme Court did
not threaten jury findings at all.215 According to him, the Convention included
the Exceptions Clause to "enable the government to modify [the appellate
jurisdiction] in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and
security.2 1 6 Clearly, Hamilton did not limit Congress's power to appellate
209. See supra Part II (outlining the recent and current legislation).
210. See BRUTUS No. 14, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 168-85, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 376 (noting Exceptions Clause's "natural meaning" allows
Congress to exempt cases from appellate jurisdiction).
211. Id., in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 168-85, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note
63, at 377.
212. FEDERAL FARMER NO. 15, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 189, 194, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 374.
213. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 8, at 539 (Alexander Hamilton).
214. Id. at 547-48.
215. Id. at 550 (noting that the appellate jurisdiction is subject to any exceptions or
regulations from Congress).
216. Id.
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review of facts. 2 17 Instead, Congress could use its power to limit the Courts'
appellate jurisdiction however it chose.
In the ratification debates, the Constitution's foes agreed that Congress
could limit the Court's jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause, but they saw
this protection as inadequate and insecure. When Richard Henry Lee voiced
concerns about the jury trial, he belittled the Exceptions Clause because
Congress could repeal anything it passed.218 Grayson likewise found it little
comfort because Congress could choose not to make exceptions and
regulations, which meant that "trial by jury is given up to the discretion of
Congress. 219 Mason similarly remarked that "mere hope is not a sufficient
security. ,220 Among other things, Patrick Henry predicted that the Court would
overturn any exceptions, thus rendering the Clause moot.221 He also criticized
the Exceptions Clause for "conced[ing] everything to the virtue of Congress."
222
These men did not contest that Congress could limit the Court, but they
doubted that it would.
In the ratification debates, the Constitution's friends defended Article III
by underscoring the Exceptions Clause. In Pennsylvania, Wilson summarized
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction: "In two cases the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction-that affecting ambassadors, and when a state shall be a party. It is
true it has appellate jurisdiction in more, but it will have it under such
restrictions as Congress shall ordain."223 In Virginia, Pendleton clarified that
the Exceptions Clause allowed Congress to "make such regulations as they may
think conducive to the public convenience. 2 24 Madison also highlighted
Congress's power: "Where [Article III] speaks of appellate jurisdiction, it
expressly provides that such regulations will be made as will accommodate
every citizen, so far as practicable in any government. 2 25 He argued that this
clause allowed Congress to fix whatever "inconveniences" might arise from
217. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the Exceptions
Clause).
218. See 1 ELuOr, supra note 85, at 504 (objecting that legislation would not fix a
constitutional problem).
219. 3 ELLioTr, supra note 85, at 568.
220. Id. at 524; see also id. at 528 (noting Mason's concern that Congress may or may not
regulate).
221. See id. at 541 (predicting that the Court would invalidate any exceptions and
regulations).
222. Id. at 544.
223. 2 ELLIOTr, supra note 85, at 493.
224. 3 ELLIO1r, supra note 85, at 519.
225. Id. at 534.
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diversity jurisdiction.226 Thus, he concluded that the judicial power could be
given with confidence.227 Later, he noted that Congress could use its power to
limit "vexatious appeals. ',228 John Marshall addressed Henry's critique of the
Exceptions Clause:
What is the meaning of the term exception? Does it not mean an alteration
and diminution? Congress is empowered to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the Supreme Court. These
exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature may think proper for the
interest and liberty of the people.229
Marshall, like the others, took a broad view of Congress's power under the
Exceptions Clause.
Other Founders confirm Congress's expansive power. Noah Webster
responded to objections to federal appellate powers: "But the truth is, the
creation of all inferior courts is in the power of Congress; and the constitution
provides that Congress may make such exceptions from the right of appeals as
they shall judge proper."230 Roger Sherman noted that Congress had "full
power to regulate [the judiciary] by law" and could "vary the regulations at
different times as circumstances may differ."23' Later he described the federal
judicial power:
It was thought necessary... to extend the judicial powers of the United
States to the enumerated cases, under such regulations and with such
exceptions as shall be provided by law, which will doubtless reduce them
to cases of such-magnitude and importance as cannot safely be trusted to
the final decision of the courts of particular states .... 232 [emphasis added]
Hugh Williamson replied to charges that federal courts would harm the poor by
noting that:
226. Id. at 535.
227. See id. ("Were I to select a power which might be given with confidence, it would be
judicial power.").
228. Id. at 538.
229. Id. at 560; see also 1 MONROE, WRrINGS, supra note 147, at 384-87, reprinted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 252 (noting that Congress will use its Exceptions Clause power to
secure the jury trial in civil cases).
230. Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal
Constitution, Philadelphia, 17 October 1787 [hereinafter Webster, Examination], in FRIENDS,
supra note 84, at 373, 395.
231. Sherman, A Citizen ofNew Haven, Ltter I, NEw HAvEN GAZETTE (Dec. 18, 1788), in
FRIENDS, supra note 84, at 263, 265.
232. Sherman, Citizen II, supra note 84, in FRIENDS, supra note 84, at 266, 270.
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the appeals being with such exceptions, and under such regulations as
Congress shall make, will never be permitted for trifling sums, or under
trivial pretenses, unless we can suppose that the national Legislature shall
be composed of knaves and fools.... The powers of Judiciary naturally
arise from those of the Legislature.233
Similarly, Fisher Ames remarked that jurisdiction flowed "to the courts as the
Legislature may positively enact." 234 In a letter to Washington, Chief Justice
Jay clarified the Exceptions Clause:
The 2d Section [of Article III] enumerates the cases to which the Judicial
power shall extend. It gives to the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in
only two cases, but in all others vests it with appellate jurisdiction, and that
with such exceptions, and under such regulations as Congress shall make.235
These Founders understood that the Exceptions Clause gave Congress control
over jurisdiction.
Early observers of the United States realized that Congress controlled the
federal courts' jurisdiction. According to de Tocqueville, "[a]fter having
recognized the means of fixing federal competence, the legislators of the Union
determined the cases ofjurisdiction in which it would be exercised., 236 That is,
Congress defined federal court jurisdiction. Justice Story noted two
possibilities under the Exceptions Clause: (1) the Supreme Court has complete
appellate jurisdiction unless Congress acts to repeal part of it, or (2) the Court
has no appellate jurisdiction unless Congress confers some.237 Story held to the
former, thus recognizing that Congress can limit the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction.
238
These debates and statements regarding the Exceptions Clause show that
both sides agreed that Congress could limit federal jurisdiction. Critics feared
that Congress would not use this power enough, while supporters said Congress
233. Hugh Williamson, Remarks on the New Plan of Government, DAILY ADVERTISER
(Feb. 25-27, 1788), in FRIENDS, supra note 84, at 272,275-76. Williamson represented North
Carolina in the Constitutional Convention.
234. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 786-830 (Gales& Seaton eds., 1834), reprinted in 4 FOuNDERS',
supra note 63, at 150.
235. John Jay, Draft of Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington
(Sept. 15, 1790), in 2 McREE, supra note 83, at 293-96, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note
63, at 161.
236. DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note 131, at 135.
237. See 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 135, § 1767, reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS',
supra note 63, at 388-89 (noting two possibilities under Exceptions Clause).
238. See id., reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 388-89 (arguing that if Congress
does not act, the Court has full appellate jurisdiction). But see infra Part III.E. 1 (showing that
the case law does not support Story on this point).
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could limit jurisdiction for any reason. Thus, the pending legislation clearly
complies with the Founders' understanding of the Exceptions Clause.
D. Past Congressional Controls
Throughout its history, Congress has exercised its power over federal
court jurisdiction. It has done so in different ways at different times, but these
laws confirm what the Constitution, its foundational principles, and the
Founders have made clear: Congress has the plenary power to limit federal
jurisdiction. This subpart surveys some of this past legislation to show that
Congress has often passed bills similar to those in the 108th and 109th
Congresses.
1. The Judiciary Act of 1 789 &Its Progeny
The Judiciary Act of 1789 embodies the Founders' intent for Article III.239
Fifty-four members of the first Congress were delegates either to the
Constitutional Convention or to their state ratification convention.24 ° Oliver
Ellsworth, William Patterson, and Caleb Strong-all delegates to the
Constitutional Convention-served on the committee that drafted the Act.24'
Ellsworth and Patterson 242 were the primary forces behind it. 243 Madison
argued for it in the House244 and endorsed it before the vote.245 In the Senate,
239. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 351-52 (1816) (noting role ofthose who
framed, supported, and opposed the Constitution in first Congress); see also RICHARD H.
FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 28 (4th
ed. 1996), quoted in H. REP. No. 108-691, at 13 (2004) (noting that Judiciary Act is "widely
viewed as an indicator of the original understanding of Article III" and federal jurisdiction).
240. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (R. Morris 6th ed., 1982), quoted in H.
REP. No 108-614, at 8 (2004) (noting that fifty-four members of the first Congress attended
Constitutional or state ratification conventions).
241. See William R. Casto, The First Congress's Understanding of Its Authority over the
Federal Courts 'Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REv. 1101, 1105 [hereinafter Casto, First Congress]
(1985) (noting Ellsworth's, Patterson's, and Strong's role in drafting the Act).
242. See COHEN & VARAT, supra note 19, at 1680 (noting that both later served as justices
on the Supreme Court).
243. See Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1105 ("Ellsworth was the father of the
legislation and its moving force. Patterson acted as his principal lieutenant.").
244. See 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 812-13 (J. Gales ed., 1789), cited in H. REP. No. 108-614, at
8 (noting Madison's arguments).
245. See Gazette of the United States (Sept. 19, 1789) at 3, col. 2, cited in H. REP. No. 108-
614, at 9 (noting Madison's endorsement).
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"eight of the ten former delegates to the Constitutional Convention vot[ed] for
it.,,246
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress restricted the federal courts'
jurisdiction in several important ways. First, it did not give inferior courts
federal question jurisdiction over civil cases. 247 It allowed them to hear federal
crimes but not civil claims arising under the Constitution or federal law.248
Though at least two proposals would have conferred federal question
jurisdiction, Congress gave the lower courts jurisdiction based on "the nature of
the parties rather than the nature of the dispute."249 The district courts had civil
jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases, some alien tort claims, some
common law cases involving more than $100, and suits against consuls or vice-
consuls.25° If the United States filed a claim or appeal that exceeded $500, the
circuit courts had original jurisdiction.251 But if it brought a small civil action,
a copyright action, or a patent action, it had to do so in state court.
2
1
2
Except for a short time during 1801, the lower federal courts had no
federal question jurisdiction until after the Civil War.253 In 1875, the lower
courts could hear for the first time "all suits of a civil nature... arising under
the Constitution" or federal laws and treaties.254 But Congress quickly
restricted this jurisdiction with a $2,000 jurisdictional minimum. 255 By 1958,
the inferior courts could only hear federal question cases involving at least
246. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 52 (July 17, 1789), cited in H. REP. 108-614, at 9 (2004).
247. See Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1116 (calling the lack of this
jurisdiction "the most remarkable limitation" on jurisdiction); see also FALLON ET AL., supra
note 239, at 29, quoted in H. REP. No. 108-614, at 8 n.30 (noting that the Judiciary Act gave no
general federal question jurisdiction to the lower courts).
248. See Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1116 (noting general grant of
jurisdiction for federal crimes).
249. Id.
250. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (establishing civil jurisdiction of
the district courts).
251. See id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79 (establishing circuit courts' original jurisdiction in non-
diversity cases).
252. Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1117 (noting limits on federal jurisdiction
under the Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125-26 (1790), and the Patent Act of
1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790)).
253. See FALLON ET AL., HART & WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 827 (5th ed.) (stating that unless there was diversity, most cases had to go through state
courts).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 829 (noting limits on federal question jurisdiction in Act of March 3, 1887,
20 Stat. 552).
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$10,000.256 It was not until 1980 that Congress abolished the amount in
controversy requirement so that the lower courts can now hear "all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."257 Even
so, this statutory jurisdiction includes only a portion of the full Article III
grant.258
Second, the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction. The federal courts could hear civil cases between citizens of
different states or between a foreigner and a citizen, but only if at least $500
were at stake. 259 Yet, Article III does not impose this requirement. 260 This was
no random figure, for it "effectively precluded a significant group of British
creditors from having a federal court vindicate rights secured by the most
important treaty in United States history. 261 It also forced nearly all common
law tort actions into state court.
262
Under the Assignee Clause, if people from different states sued over a
promissory note that had been assigned, the federal courts had no jurisdiction
unless they would have had it if the assignor was a party.263 This prevented
people from artificially creating diversity jurisdiction, but it also "had an
undesirable impact upon interstate commerce. 264 Hence, federal courts could
not hear certain diversity cases even though the Constitution granted them this
jurisdiction.265
256. See id. at 830 (noting increased amount in controversy requirement in Act of July 25,
1958, 72 Stat. 415).
257. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)).
258. See ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS
286-91 (2003) (noting difference between constitutional and statutory arising under
jurisdiction).
259. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 §§ 11-12, 1 Stat. 73, 78-80 (imposing amount in
controversy requirements).
260. See U.S. CONST., art. Il, § 2 (setting out the elements of the judicial power).
261. Compare Clinton, supra note 13, at 850 (dismissing $500 amount as trivial) with
Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1112 (citing British Foreign Office Records for
individual debts to the British).
262. See Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1113 (noting effect of§ 11 with respect
to common law tort actions).
263. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79 (limiting jurisdiction for suits
involving assigned promissory notes); see also Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1114
("If a note had been assigned, there would be no jurisdiction unless the court would have had
jurisdiction of a suit commenced by the payee.").
264. Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1114.
265. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (granting diversity jurisdiction).
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Third, the Judiciary Act limited the Supreme Court's ability to review
state decisions on federal and constitutional law.26 For the Supreme Court to
review a state court decision, the case had to question the constitutionality of
(1) a treaty or federal statute, (2) a state statute, or (3) the interpretation of the
Constitution or a federal statute, and the state court had to rule against the
federal claim.267 Thus, the Court could not review cases where the state court
upheld a federal right, even if it misinterpreted the Constitution to reach this
268decision. So neither the Supreme Court nor inferior courts had jurisdiction
over some cases "arising under this Constitution," federal law, and federal
treaties, 269 even though they clearly fell within the judicial power of the United
States.27° Section 25 also limited the Supreme Court's alienage jurisdiction
over state cases; it could only review state decisions that "invalidated or
misconstrued treaties."27 ' Also, the Supreme Court could not review state cases
based on diversity. 272 These restrictions had the potential to undermine a
uniform interpretation of the Constitution and federal law, to hamper
international relations, and to obstruct national unity, but Congress still
prevented the Supreme Court from reviewing these cases.273
Fourth, the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited mandamus jurisdiction. It did
not give federal courts the authority to issue writs of mandamus against federal
officers, even though this is within the judicial power.274 Congress did not
grant the courts this power until 1962.275
266. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 239, at 29, quoted in H. REP. No 108-614, at 8 n.31
(explaining limits on Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act).
267. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (limiting Supreme Court
review of state court decisions).
268. See Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1118 (noting when Court could not
review state decision).
269. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1 (setting out the elements of the judicial power).
270. See Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1118 (noting that cases clearly within
the judicial power could arise "that were excluded from the combined appellate and original
jurisdiction of the federal courts").
271. See id. at 1118-19 (noting the lack of alienage jurisdiction).
272. See id. at 1119 (noting that the Court lacked jurisdiction over diversity cases from
state courts).
273. See id. at 1119-20 (stating that the Supreme Court's inability to review alienage cases
could affect claims of British citizens and its inability to review diversity cases could discourage
interstate commerce).
274. See McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. 598,604 (1821) (noting the "United States have not
thought it proper to delegate that power [mandamus against a federal officer] to their own
courts").
275. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 87-748, § 1(a), 76
Stat. 744, 744 (1962)) (granting the federal district courts mandamus jurisdiction for federal
officers).
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Fifth, the Judiciary Act of 1789 restricted the federal courts' habeas
corpus jurisdiction. Under Section 14, federal courts could only grant writs of
habeas corpus to individuals who were in federal custody, held under federal
276law, or were defendants or witnesses in federal court. A prisoner in state
custody could not raise a habeas claim in federal court, even if his
constitutional rights were at stake.277
After the Judiciary Act passed, Attorney General Randolph 278 suggested
that Congress remove even more cases from the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction.279 He observed that though the Constitution created the Supreme
Court, Congress gave it its "first motion," and that the lower courts would not
exist unless Congress wanted them.280 He argued that Congress should use this
authority to the point that "some cases within the judicial power of the United
States could not be filed in federal court, could not be removed to a federal
court, and could not be appealed to a federal court.,
28'
Thus, the first Congress, which included many of those who wrote and
ratified Article III, not only thought that it had the power to restrict the federal
courts' jurisdiction, but it also did so. Despite the effect on national uniformity,
international relations, and personal rights, Congress prevented the courts from
exercising part of the judicial power.
2. 1930s
The Norris-LaGuardia Act limited the federal courts' ability to enjoin
labor disputes.282 Congress passed it in a second wave of reforms after the
276. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (allowing only federal
prisoners habeas relief).
277. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 19, at 243 (noting that in 1867 Congress expanded
the writ of habeas corpus to include people in state custody).
278. See 2 FARRAND 1937, supra note 102, at 123-27, quoted in Casto, First Congress,
supra note 241, at 1121 n. 136 (explaining that he did not sign Constitution partly due to lack of
limits on judiciary); see also 3 ELLIOTr, supra note 85, at 572, cited in Casto, First Congress,
supra note 241, at 1121 n.136 (defending Congress's broad power over Court's appellate
jurisdiction).
279. See Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1121 (recounting Randolph's preference
for a pre-trial removal system rather than appellate review of state court cases).
280. AM. STATE PAPERS, Misc. No. 17 (Dec. 31, 1790), quoted in Casto, First Congress,
supra note 242, at 1122.
281. Casto, First Congress, supra note 241, at 1122.
282. Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 72-65, § 1, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (1932) (codifiedat 29
U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
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judicial abuses surrounding the Pullman Strike of 1894.283 It prevented any
federal court 284 from issuing any temporary restraining order, temporary
injunction, or permanent injunction in any case involving a labor dispute28' by
removing the courts' jurisdiction unless the cases fell into narrow statutory
exceptions and the courts followed carefully defined procedures.286 Hence,
Congress used its power to limit federal court jurisdiction in order to dictate
procedure and limit the available remedies.
In 1934, Congress passed the Hiram Johnson Acts to limit inferior court
jurisdiction. 287 It withdrew their jurisdiction to review certain administrative
orders regarding public utility rates. Even if the parties had diverse citizenship
or a constitutional claim, the district courts could not hear these cases.288 Once
again, Congress used its power to regulate federal court jurisdiction to remove
cases that would otherwise have been within the judicial power of the United
States.
3. 1940s
Congress passed the Emergency Price Controls Act of 1942 to regulate
and stabilize prices and rents during World War 11.289 The Act laid out an
administrative review process for any regulations or price schedules set by the
290Price Administrator. Congress created the Emergency Court of Appeals and
291
gave it exclusive jurisdiction over the Administrator's decisions. Its rulings
were subject to Supreme Court review,292 but it had no power to issue
283. See OwEN M. Fiss & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJNCTONS 17 (2d. ed. 1984) (stating that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was a second wave of reforms in response to In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895)).
284. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(d), 47 Stat. at 73 (defining "court of the United States").
285. Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 70.
286. See id. §§ 4, 7, 47 Stat. at 70-71 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 107) (setting out
limits and exceptions for labor injunctions).
287. See The Johnson Acts, Pub. L. No. 73-222, ch. 283,48 Stat. 775 (1934) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq. (2000)) (limiting the federal district courts' jurisdiction to enjoin or
suspend certain public utilities decisions).
288. See id. (stating that the given diversity and federal question cases were outside of
federal jurisdiction).
289. See Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, ch. 26, § 1, 56 Stat.
23, 23-24 (repealed 1946) (stating purposes of the Act).
290. See id. § 203, 56 Stat. at 31 (creating an administrative review process for regulations
and price schedules).
291. See id. § 204(a), 56 Stat. at 31-32 (creating the Emergency Court of Appeals).
292. See id. § 204(d), 56 Stat. at 32-33 (allowing a writ of certiorari from the Emergency
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temporary restraining orders or interlocutory decrees.293 No other district or
circuit court had jurisdiction over these orders, even though they clearly arose
under federal law.294
Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 to correct the Supreme
Court's misinterpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.295 This Act
deprived all courts-federal and state---of jurisdiction over certain cases
against employers for failure to pay minimum or overtime wages under three
federal laws.296 Hence, Congress used its power to limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to correct what it considered ajudicial mistake, and it removed a
certain class of cases arising under federal law from all courts in the nation.
4. 1960s
The Voting Rights Act of 1965297 dictated how certain states could change
their voter qualifications and procedures.298 If the Attorney General did not
object to the change, the state could file in the District Court for the District of
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that the change would not abridge the
right to vote based on color or race. 299 A three-judge panel would hear the case
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court).
293. See id. § 204(c), 56 Stat. at 32 (limiting Emergency Court's jurisdiction to issue
injunctions and interlocutory decrees).
294. See id. § 204(a), 56 Stat. at 31-32 (giving the Emergency Court exclusive
jurisdiction).
295. See Portal-to-Portal Act, ch. 52, § 1(a), 61 Stat. 84, 84-85 (1947) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 252(d) (2000)) (objecting to judicial interpretations of Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938); see also Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect Marriage for the States:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, 108th Cong. 12-13 (2004) [hereinafter Marriage Hearing] (statement of
Phyllis Schlafly) (stating that Portal-to-Portal Act prevented Court from enforcing liability
under Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944)); CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1992), S. Doc. No. 103-6, at
791, quoted in Marriage Hearing, supra at 54 (noting that Portal-to-Portal Act extinguished
back pay claims that arose from Court interpretations of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
296. See Portal-to-Portal Act § 2(d), 61 Stat. at 86 (removing jurisdiction from state and
federal courts over claims for employer's failure to pay minimum or overtime wages under Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938).
297. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 439 (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (2000)).
298. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (explaining how to change voter qualifications and
procedures).
299. See id. (setting out declaratory judgment procedure).
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subject to Supreme Court review.300  Thus, Congress used its power over
federal jurisdiction to favor certain federal rights.
In the Medicare Act, 301 Congress used its power over federal court
jurisdiction to insulate certain findings from both administrative and judicial
review.30 2 All of these determinations were based on federal law, and hence,
they were within "the judicial Power of the United States. 30 3 But by law,
Congress exempted them from the jurisdiction of the courts.
5. 1990s-2000s
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 limits federal
jurisdiction in several ways.304 First, it restricts federal courts' ability to hear
second or successive habeas corpus applications.0 5 Second, it deprives all
courts ofjurisdiction to review final deportation orders against aliens who have
committed certain criminal offenses.30 6  Third, it insulates the Attorney
General's decision to hold an alien awaiting deportation from judicial review,
including habeas corpus. 307 "The law thus appears to foreclose all judicial
review of deportation orders.
308
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA) 309 also limits federal court jurisdiction. It repeals a provision
that "authorized judicial review in the circuit courts of appeals and guaranteed
300. See id. (mandating that a panel from the District Court for the District of Columbia
hear the case).
301. Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 101-22,79
Stat. 290, 353 (1965).
302. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(i)(1) (protecting specified findings from judicial review).
303. U.S. CONsT. art. III, §§ 1-2.
304. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
305. See id. § 106, 110 Stat. at 1220 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) to limit successive
and second habeas applications).
306. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2000) (removing jurisdiction from all courts over
deportation orders for criminals); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 297 (discussing
same).
307. See Chemerinsky,supra note 14, at 297 n.9 (explaining how 8 U.S.C. §§ 1228(c) and
1252(e)(2)(A) combine to repeal 8 U.S.C. § 1535(e)(2), thus limiting an alien's habeas
possibilities).
308. Id. at 297.
309. Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
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habeas corpus upon detention."3 0 It limits judicial review to review of a final
order for "all questions of law and fact," including constitutional questions,
311surrounding a deportation. It insulates some of the Attorney General's
discretionary decisions regarding deportation from judicial review because it
withdraws jurisdiction over those matters from the courts.312 It also limits the
remedies federal courts may grant in deportation cases.313
The 107th Congress passed a flurry of limits on federal courts'
jurisdiction. It protected the Attorney General's decisions regarding rewards
from judicial review.314 It insulated the plans and special use permit for the
World War II Memorial from all judicial review.31 5 It prevented federal courts
from reviewing certain estimates and decisions of the Under Secretary of
Transportation 316 and Federal Aviation Administrator. 3
17  Another law 318
prohibits courts from reviewing certain determinations of the President.319 The
Trade Act of 2002 prevents federal courts from reviewing duties on wool.
320
Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,321 if the Attorney General detains an
alien or certifies that an alien is a national security risk, the federal courts can
review these decisions only through the habeas corpus proceedings delineated
in that Act.322 Senator Daschle sponsored a law that authorized the Secretary of
310. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 297.
311. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2000), quoted in Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 297
(restricting all judicial review of a deportation proceeding to review of the final order).
312. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2000) (listing decisions not subject to judicial
review); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 297 (focusing on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)).
313. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (limiting remedies available for orders brought under
§ 1225(b)(1)).
314. See 21 st Century Dept. of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
273, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 1758, 1767-71 (2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530C(b)(L)(v))
(shielding decisions regarding rewards from judicial review).
315. Act of May 28,2001, Pub. L. No. 107-11, § 3, 115 Stat. 19, 19 (removing memorial's
location, special use permit, and actions of two federal commissions from judicial review).
316. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 118(a), 115 Stat.
597,625 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44940) (protecting Under Secretary's decisions in this
chapter).
317. Id. § 119(d)(3), 115 Stat. at 629 (codifiedat49 U.S.C. § 45301(b)(1)(B)) (shielding
Administrator's cost determinations).
318. Small Business Liability Relief& Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
319. See id. § 102, 115 Stat. at 2356-60 (insulating certain presidential decisions from
judicial review).
320. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 5101(c)(1)(D), 116 Stat. 933, 1042-46
(prohibiting judicial or administrative review of amount of duties).
321. The USAPATRIOT ACTof2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
322. See id. § 412(b), 115 Stat. at 350-52 (restricting review of the Attorney General's
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Agriculture to "address promptly the risk of fire and insect infestation" in
several South Dakota forests.323 Besides limiting administrative review, the
law stated that "any action authorized by this section shall not be subject to
judicial review by any court of the United States. 3 24 Congress has also
prevented courts from reviewing the decision to activate the National Disaster
Medical System.325 It also limited a court's ability to review documents from
the National Reconnaissance Office and the possible remedies that a court
326can issue. 6 Also, federal courts cannot review the decision of whether or
not to certify an act as an act of terrorism.327
In sum, these laws show that Congress has exercised its power over
federal court jurisdiction in the past. It has done so on everything from
administrative to constitutional issues, and it has used this power to address
judicial abuses and misinterpretations. Thus, these past congressional
controls further bolster the case for bills like those in the 108th and 109th
Congresses.
E. Federal Court Confirmation
In addition to the text of the Constitution, its principles, the statements
of the Founding Fathers, and past congressional controls, federal case law
confirms Congress's power to restrict federal court jurisdiction. Four
categories of principles arise from the case law to illustrate this. The first
involves the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the second covers the
lower courts' jurisdiction, the third looks at whether federal claims must be
heard in federal court, and the fourth examines judicial treatment of past
limitations.
decisions).
323. 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 706(b)(1)-(2), 116 Stat. 820,
865.
324. Id. § 7060), 116 Stat. at 868-69.
325. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 102(a), 116 Stat. 594, 599-603.
326. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306,
§ 502(a), 116 Stat. 2383, 2405-07 (2002) (limiting the availability of judicial review and
possible remedies).
327. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(C), 116
Stat. 2322, 2324 (stating that determination of whether something is an act of terrorism is not
subject to judicial review).
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1. Congress & The Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction
One set of principles confirms that Congress can control the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. First, the case law shows that the Constitution
defines the maximum limits for the Court's appellate jurisdiction, but Congress
does not have to confer all of it. As Chief Justice Ellsworth noted, while the
Constitution vests original and appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court,328
the latter is "qualified; inasmuch as it is given 'with such exceptions and under
such regulations, as the Congress shall make.0'3 29 Many have argued that
because the Constitution gives the Supreme Courtjurisdiction, Congress cannot
limit the appellate jurisdiction. 3 0 Ellsworth ridiculed this argument, 33 ' and
Justice Chase explained its errors:
The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal Courts derive
their judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political
truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power, (except in a few specified
instances) belongs to Congress. If Congress has given the power to this
Court, we possess it, not otherwise: and if congress has not given the
power to us, or to any other court, it still remains at the legislative disposal.
Besides, congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every subject, in every
form, which the constitution might warrant.332
328. See Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. 321, 327 (1796) (reciting that the Constitution gives
the Court jurisdiction).
329. Id.; see also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 721 (1838) (noting
Congress's power to define the Court's powers for its original jurisdiction and "to distribute the
residue of the judicial power between this and the inferior courts"); Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S.
506, 512-13 (1868) (noting that Constitution grants jurisdiction to the Court subject to
Congress); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 385 (1882) (same).
330. See Turner v. Bank ofN. Am., 4 U.S. 8, 9-10 (1799) (arguing that Congress could not
limit the power that the Constitution gave to the judiciary); see also Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236,
244-45 (1845) (same); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 509 (1868) (same); see also
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1810) (arguing that the Court has
jurisdiction unless Congress makes an exception); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v.
Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 513-20 (1898) (same).
331. See Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4. U.S. 8, 10 n.l (1799) (pointing out that this
argument leads to the false idea that the Court can distribute and regulate its own power without
the legislature).
332. Id.; see also Cary v. Curtis, 44, U.S. 236, 245 (1845) (reiterating that Congress
distributes and organizes the Court's power); Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506,512-13 (1868)
(noting that Congress controls the appellate jurisdiction); United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258,
259 (1877) (same); Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa, & Key West Ry. Co., 148 U.S.
372, 378 (1893) (same); United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1908) (same).
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Chief Justice Marshall conceded that the Constitution would give the Court
jurisdiction if Congress had not defined the appellate jurisdiction in the
Judiciary Act of 1 789. But he noted that while Article III gives appellate
powers, those powers "are limited and regulated by the Judicial Act, and by
such other acts as have been passed on the subject. 3 34 Thus, the Court has
rejected the argument that its appellate jurisdiction comes directly from the
Constitution.335 Instead, Article III:
delineated only the great outlines of the judicial power; leaving the details
to congress, in whom was vested, by express delegation, the power to pass
all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers except
their own. The distribution and appropriate exercise of the judicial power,336
must therefore be made by the laws passed by congress....
Thus, the Constitution sets the maximum extent of the Court's appellate and
original jurisdiction; Congress cannot expand either one. But, aside from the
original jurisdiction, Congress can allow the Court to exercise only a small part
of its appellate jurisdiction.337  If Congress does not confer appellate
jurisdiction, then the Court does not have it.
338
333. See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1810) (observing that if the
Congress had not defined the Court's appellate jurisdiction, it would have the full jurisdiction
listed in the Constitution).
334. Id. at 314; see also id. (stating that Congress's affirmative description of the Court's
jurisdiction implies "a negative on the exercise of such appellate power" not included in the
statute); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845) (noting that Congress defines and distributes
the Court's appellate jurisdiction); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1868) (same);
United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258, 259 (1877) (same); Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville,
Tampa, & Key West Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372,378 (1893) (same); Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389, 401 (1973) (same).
335. See Turner, 4. U.S. at 10 n. I (rejecting argument that the Court's jurisdiction comes
directly from the Constitution); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1845) (same);
Durousseau, 10 U.S. at 313-14 (same); Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 513 (1868) (same).
336. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 721 (1838).
337. See, e.g., Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. 8, 10 n.1 (1799) ("[C]ongress is not
bound.., to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every subject, in every form,
which the constitution might warrant."); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845) (same);
Daniels v. R.R. Co., 70 U.S. 250,254 (1866) (same); United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258,259
(1877) (same); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 385-86 (1882) (same); Am. Constr. Co. v.
Jacksonville, Tampa, & Key West Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372,378 (1893) (same); Palmorev. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973) (same).
338. See Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. 321,327 (1796) ("If Congress has provided no rule to
regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction.... ."); Durousseau, 10
U.S. at 318 (stating that Congress's exceptions "are implied from the intent manifested by the
affirmative description of its powers"); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 119 (1847) (noting that
Congress defines the scope of the Court's appellate jurisdiction); United States v. Young, 94
U.S. 258, 259 (1877) (same); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. at 385 (same); Am. Constr. Co. v.
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Second, the case law indicates that the Supreme Court interprets
jurisdictional statutes narrowly. On one hand, if the statute grants jurisdiction,
then the Court presumes that it lacks all jurisdiction beyond the terms of the
statute. For example, Ellsworth and Marshall noted that if Congress does not
confer appellate jurisdiction, then the Court does not have it.339 Nevertheless,
some have argued that the Court has appellate jurisdiction unless Congress
makes an exception.340 Marshall agreed that this would be true "if the supreme
court had been created by law, without describing its jurisdiction. 3 41  He
continued: "But as the jurisdiction of the court has been described, it has been
regulated by congress, and an affirmative description of its powers must be
understood as a regulation, under the constitution, prohibiting the exercise of
other powers than those described. 3 42 Hence, he disclaimed "all jurisdiction
not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the United States," and refused
to hear a case unless a statute gave the Court jurisdiction.343 The Court has
consistently held to Marshall's and Ellsworth's position, 344 even after the Civil
War.
345
Jacksonville, Tampa, & Key West Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 378 (1893) (same); Plaquemines
Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 517 (1898) (same); United States v. Bitty, 208
U.S. 393, 399-400 (1908) (same).
339. See Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. 321, 327 (1796) (noting that the Court could not
exercise appellate jurisdiction without a congressional statute); United States v. More, 7 U.S.
159, 173 (1805) (dismissing because by affirmatively granting appellate jurisdiction, Congress
implicitly prohibited the Court from exercising other powers).
340. See, e.g., More, 7 U.S. at 172-73 (summarizing the Attorney General's argument).
341. Id. at 173; see also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 93 (1807) (noting that the
jurisdiction of common law courts depends on the common law, but "courts which are created
by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that
jurisdiction"); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1810) (observing that if the
Congress had not defined and limited the Court's appellate jurisdiction with the Judiciary Act, it
would have had the full jurisdiction listed in the Constitution).
342. More, 7 U.S. at 173; see also Durousseau, 10 U.S. at 314, 318 (noting that the first
Congress's affirmative description of the Court's appellate jurisdiction prohibits it from
exercising powers not given).
343. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93; see also id. at 94-100 (casting issue as whether any
statute gave the Court "the power to award a writ of habeas corpus" in this case); Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 722-24 (1838) (examining the Judiciary Act of 1789 to
determine if it had jurisdiction over this case).
344. See Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 119 (1847) (noting that Congress controls the
appellate jurisdiction).
345. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 513 (1868) (stating that the Court has no
appellate jurisdiction unless given by Congress); United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258, 259
(1877) (same); The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 385 (1882) (same); Am. Constr. Co. v.
Jacksonville, Tampa, & Key West Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372,378 (1893) (same); United States v.
Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1908) (same).
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On the other hand, if a statute withdraws previously granted jurisdiction,
then the Court presumes that it can still hear cases not mentioned in the terms
of the statute. Thus, Congress can remove jurisdiction that it has previously
given the Court,346 and the Court must respect that decision.347 Yet it can still
exercise jurisdiction that Congress previously gave and has not taken away.348
This does not undermine Congress's power over jurisdiction; rather, these
decisions affirm that power.349  It simply means that in a given instance,
Congress did not use its power.35 °
Third, the case law sets out the criteria for the Court to hear a case.351 It
must be within the judicial power of the United States as outlined by the
Constitution.352 It must be within the Court's appellate jurisdiction, as set in
353Congress's statutes. The case must not fall inside any constitutional or
congressional exceptions to that jurisdiction. 35 4 Last, the case must be brought
to the Court according to the procedure set by Congress.3 5 These four criteria
346. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARiz. L.
REv. 229, 238-39 (1973) (noting that Congress repealed the 1867 law to prevent the Court from
invalidating the Military Reconstruction Act).
347. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. at 513-15 (dismissing case due to Congress's explicit
exception).
348. See id. at 515 (stating that the 1868 law repealed only jurisdiction given in the 1867
law and nothing else); Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 106 (1868) (same).
349. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. at 98, 102-03 (affirming that the Court's appellate
jurisdiction was subject to Congress's control); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658-61 (1996)
(tracing past limits on federal court jurisdiction); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988)
(stating that Congress must clearly state its intent to remove a constitutional issue from judicial
review).
350. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. at 102, 105 (noting that no act of Congress affected
Court's jurisdiction); Felker, 518 U.S. at 661 (same for AEDPA); Webster, 486 U.S. at 603
(same for National Security Act).
351. See Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. 212, 214 (1803) (developing criteria for appeals); Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 93 (1807) (disclaiming "all jurisdiction not given by the constitution,
or by the laws of the United States").
352. See Clarke, 5 U.S. at 214 (stating that case must be within "the judicial authority of
the United States"); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93 (disclaiming "all jurisdiction not given by
the constitution").
353. See Clarke, 5 U.S. at 214 (stating that the Court must have "appellate jurisdiction in
all such cases"); see also supra notes 328-38 and accompanying text (discussing congressional
control of appellate jurisdiction).
354. See Clarke, 5 U.S. at 214 (stating that case cannot be "within any exception made by
the constitution or by any act of congress"); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 120 (1847)
(dismissing habeas claim due to amount-in-controversy); Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514
(1868) (dismissing the case due to Congress's explicit exception).
355. See Clarke, 5 U.S. at 214 (dismissing the case because Congress had "not authorized
an appeal or writ of error"); see also Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. 321, 327 (1796) (stating that
Court must follow Congress's procedures); Barry, 46 U.S. at 119 (same); United States v.
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essentially form two principles: the Constitution must allow the Court to hear
the appeal, and Congress must do so as well.356
Fourth, the case law shows that Congress's reason for limiting the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction is irrelevant. When faced with a Congress that
withdrew its jurisdiction to prevent it from striking down a law,357 the Court
responded: "We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.
We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to
make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is given by express
words. 3 58  When Congress passed laws to correct Supreme Court
misinterpretation 359 or to curb judicial abuses,
360 the Court has upheld them.361
In sum, for constitutional purposes, Congress's motive is meaningless.362
Fifth, the case law shows that Congress can make exceptions to the
Court's jurisdiction, but it cannot dictate decisions. The Court has struck down
only one law that purported to restrict the Court's jurisdiction,363 and it did so
because Congress tried to dictate how the Court should treat evidence.
364
Congress can either let the Court speak or force it to be quiet,365 but it cannot
tell the Court what to say.
366
Young, 94 U.S. 258, 259 (1877) (same).
356. See Daniels v. R.R. Co., 70 U.S. 250, 254 (1866) (stating that for the Court to hear
appeal, both Constitution and an act of Congress must allow it); see, e.g., Exparte Bollman, 8
U.S. at 94-100 (interpreting Judiciary Act of 1789 to find jurisdiction before proceeding to
merits); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 722-24 (1838) (same); Clarke, 5 U.S. at
214 (dismissing case because Congress had not allowed appeals or writs of error from the
Northwestern territory's general court).
357. See Van Alstyne, supra note 346, at 238-39 (noting that Congress repealed the law
allowing the Court to hear habeas appeals to prevent the Court from striking down the Military
Reconstruction Act).
358. ExparteMcCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868).
359. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (noting that the Portal-to-Portal Act
corrected the Court).
360. See supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text (noting how the Norris-LaGuardia
Act responded to judicial excess).
361. See infra note 417 and accompanying text (upholding the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
362. See, e.g., United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393,400 (1908) (upholding asymmetrical
appeals without examining Congress's reasons).
363. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47 (1871) (noting that Congress had
exceeded its authority).
364. See id. at 147 (saying that the law directs the court as to what effect a pardon must
have).
365. See id. at 145 (stating that Congress could have validly denied the right to appeal for a
class of cases).
366. See id. at 146-47 (stating that the law was not an exception but "passed the limit
which separates the legislative from the judicial power"). But see Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
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2. Congress & The Inferior Courts'Jurisdiction
The next set of case law principles deals with Congress's control over
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts. First, the case law shows that Congress
can limit the lower federal courts' jurisdiction to any degree at all. Because it
did not have to create them, 367 "Congress is not bound ... to enlarge the
jurisdiction of the [inferior] federal courts to every subject, in every form,
which the constitution might warrant. 3 68 Chief Justice Ellsworth and others
agreed.369 Because Congress created the inferior courts by statute, they
cannot exercise power beyond what the statute allows. 370 They also must
exercise that power according to the procedures that Congress laid out.37
Furthermore, "the power which congress possess[es] to create courts of
inferiorjurisdiction, necessarily implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of
those Courts to particular objects. 3 72 Congress can exercise this power "so
Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1992) (concluding that Congress did not violate Klein by
amending the law underlying two pending cases). Congress passed a law declaring that
compliance with new standards would satisfy the statutory requirements at issue in two pending
cases, which it named. Id. at 435. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had violated
Klein. Id. at 436. The Supreme Court concluded that Congress simply used the named cases to
identify the provisions it was amending, and thus, did not violate Klein. Id. at 437-41.
367. See, e.g., Lockerty v. Philips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (confirming that Congress
could have chosen not to create inferior courts); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 551
(1962) (same).
368. Turnerv. Bank ofN. Am.,4 U.S. 8, 10n.l (1799); see also Stevenson v. Fain, 195
U.S. 165, 167 (1904) (stating that "the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts depends upon some act
of Congress"); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F.
Supp. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1973) (stating that "Congress may impart as much or as little of the
judicial power as it deems appropriate").
369. See, e.g., Turner, 4 U.S. at 10 (noting that the federal trial courts had only a small part
of their possible jurisdiction); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (same); Mayor v.
Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 252 (1868) (noting that if Congress does not grant full constitutional
jurisdiction, "the power lies dormant").
370. See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845) (noting that authority of"courts created
by statute" depends on the statute); see also United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32,
33 (1812) (noting that Congress's statutes limit lower court jurisdiction); Cooper, 73 U.S. at
252 (saying if Congress does not grant full constitutional jurisdiction, "the power lies
dormant"); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 24 (1906) (stating that lower courts can only
exercise jurisdiction given by statute); Ladew v. Tenn. Copper Co., 218 U.S. 357, 368 (1910)
(same); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,232-34 (1922) (same); Senate Select Comm.,
366 F. Supp. at 55 (same).
371. See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845) (noting that Congress controls federal
court procedures); Cooper, 73 U.S. at 251-52 (same); Venner v. Great N. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 24,
35 (1908) (same).
372. United States v. Hudson& Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32,33(1812); see also Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 721 (1838) (stating that Congress defines scope of lower courts'
jurisdiction); Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 449 (same); Venner, 209 U.S. at 35 (same); Kline v. Burke
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far as they [think] necessary and proper, "73 even if this means that the
inferior courts have no federal question jurisdiction.374 Any other position
would "elevate the judicial over the legislative branch of the government, and
to give to the former powers limited by its own discretion merely. " 375
Congress also determines whether inferior courts have exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts.376 It can also limit the remedies
lower courts can use by restricting their ability to issue certain injunctions
377
or by prohibiting all courts except one from issuing certain injunctions.378
Second, the case law outlines the necessary criteria for the lower courts
to hear a case. Both the Constitution and an act of Congress must give the
court authority to hear the case. 3 79 That is, the case must be within the
judicial power and within the court's statutory jurisdiction. Congress cannot
give the inferior courts more power than the Constitution allows, but it can
give them less. 380 But if the case does not satisfy both criteria, then the court
cannot hear it.
381
Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (same).
373. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 721 (1838).
374. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,561 (1962) (noting that Congress conferred
very little federal question jurisdiction until 1875).
375. Cary, 44 U.S. at 245.
376. See Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511,517 (1898) (noting
that Congress determines whether the inferior courts have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction).
377. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (upholding the Norris-
LaGuardia Act).
378. See Lockerty v. Philips, 319 U.S. 182, 188 (1943) (upholding the Emergency Price
Control Act); see also supra notes 289-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Emergency
Price Control Act).
379. Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 252 (1868) (stating that both the Constitution and
Congress must give jurisdiction); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,233 (1922) (same);
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55
(D.D.C. 1973) (same).
380. See Cooper, 73 U.S. at 252 (1868) (stating that Congress cannot give lower courts
more jurisdiction than the Constitution allows); see also supra notes 367-78 and accompanying
text (showing that Congress can limit lower court jurisdiction).
381. See, e.g., Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. 8, 10 (1799) (dismissing case because
Congress had not granted jurisdiction); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34
(1812) (same); Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165, 170 (1904) (same); Kentucky v. Powers, 201
U.S. 1, 35-40 (1906) (same); Ladew v. Tenn. Copper Co., 218 U.S. 357,368-69 (1910) (same);
Senate Select Comm., 366 F. Supp. at 61 (same); see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 450
(1850) (reversing lower court for the same reason).
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3. Federal Courts & Federal Claims
The third set of case law principles shows that the Constitution does
not require that a federal judge hear every federal claim. Many parties have
claimed a constitutional right to have their case heard in federal court,382
but these claims have uniformly failed.383 Even if the parties satisfy the
constitutional requirements for diversity384 or state a federal claim, 3" a
federal court cannot hear the case unless it meets the statutory
requirements.386 The Court has upheld this rule in cases with due
process, 387 habeas corpus, 388 and First Amendment implications, 389 as well
as for criminal cases.390  Though all of these parties asserted federal or
constitutional claims, the Court could not hear the case absent a statutory
permit from Congress. Hence, the Constitution does not require that
federal courts hear all federal claims.
382. See supra note 330 and accompanying text (summarizing past arguments).
383. See supra notes 331-38 and accompanying text (showing that the Court has rejected
these arguments); see also Lockerty, 319 U.S. at 187 (noting that Congress could have left all
plaintiffs to state courts with appeal to the Supreme Court); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389, 401 (1973) (noting that until 1875 state courts were the only forum for most federal law
questions); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,476-80(1976) (showing that Congress has restricted
habeas jurisdiction and can change those limits).
384. See infra notes 395-99, 405 and accompanying text (summarizing judicial treatment
of diversity limits).
385. See supra notes 331-38 and infra notes 408-18 and accompanying text (noting
judicial treatment of federal question limits).
386. See supra notes 351-56, 379-81 and accompanying text (setting forth criteria for a
court to hear a case).
387. See Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1847) (dismissing habeas claim in child
custody dispute due to amount in controversy); United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 399-400
(1908) (dismissing defendant's claim that asymmetrical appeals are unconstitutional).
388. See Barry, 46 U.S. at 119-20 (1847) (dismissing habeas claim due to amount in
controversy); Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1868) (dismissing appeal for lack of
jurisdiction); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 35-36, 40 (1906) (reversing for lack of
jurisdiction); Powell, 428 U.S. at 476-80 (tracing Congress's limits on federal habeas
jurisdiction).
389. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. at 507-08,514-15 (stating facts and dismissing for
lack of jurisdiction); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 346, at 236 (stating facts).
390. See United States v. More, 7 U.S. 159, 173-74(1805) (noting that Congress had not
given the Court criminal appellate jurisdiction for the District of Columbia); United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (noting lack of criminal jurisdiction for federal
courts).
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4. Federal Courts & Past Limitations
The last set of case law principles shows how the federal courts have
upheld and implemented Congress's restrictions on theirjurisdiction. First,
the Supreme Court has applied the restrictions on its own appellate jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Marshall3 9 and others3 92 dismissed appeals from state courts due
to Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. After the Civil War, Chief Justice
Chase dismissed a habeas appeal after Congress specifically withdrew the
Court's jurisdiction.393 The Court later upheld a statute that limited the scope
of its appellate jurisdiction over admiralty cases and the means of invoking it.
394
The Court has also upheld limits on the federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction. Ellsworth and Chase both upheld the Assignee Clause of the
Judiciary Act of 1789395 against arguments that it unconstitutionally limited the
courts' jurisdiction.396 Although the amount in controversy provisions limited
diversity jurisdiction,397 the Court dismissed an alien's habeas corpus petition
due to this restriction.398 It also upheld other requirements for diversity
cases.
399
Even with constitutional rights at stake, the Court has applied Congress's
limits on jurisdiction. It respected restrictions on habeas appeals, even with
400First Amendment rights in question. In order to protect executive
391. See Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S. 268, 270 (1806) (dismissing case after state court
granted federal claim).
392. See Walker v. Taylor, 46 U.S. 64, 68 (1847) (dismissing appeal after state court
granted the federal claim).
393. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 515 (1868) (dismissing appeal after Congress
removed jurisdiction).
394. See The Francis Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 386-87 (1882) (upholding restriction on
admiralty appeals to questions of law presented in a bill of exceptions).
395. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text (explaining the Assignee Clause).
396. See Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. 8, 10 n.l (1799) (upholding the Assignee
Clause).
397. See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text (explaining the amount in controversy
requirement).
398. See Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 120-21 (1847) (dismissing petition due to amount
in controversy).
399. See Ladew v. Tenn. Copper Co., 218 U.S. 357,367-69 (1910) (dismissing diversity
case that was not brought in the district where one party resided); Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S.
165, 170 (1904) (dismissing diversity case over land grants as Congress had not granted
jurisdiction).
400. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 508, 515 (1868) (explaining libel charges and
dismissing case); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 346, at 236, 245-48 (noting facts and how
the Court could have heard the case).
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discretion,4 ° ' Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).4 °2 Even so, the Court upheld the Act's limits on
judicial review and effectively vacated lower court rulings,4 °3 a decision lower
courts have followed.4°
Second, federal courts have upheld and implemented restrictions on lower
court jurisdiction. Like Ellsworth and Chase, Justice Grier upheld the Assignee
Clause for the lower courts. 40 5 The Court dismissed habeas corpus petitions
that did not satisfy the amount in controversy, thus applying the Judiciary Act
of 1789 to the lower courts.406 It also denied all claims that lower courts can
have implied rights of jurisdiction.4 °7
Federal courts have also upheld Congress's limits on the lower courts'
ability to hear federal law questions. The lower courts upheld the Medicare
Act's limits on judicial review40 8 in the face of due process and separation of
powers challenges. 40 9 The Seventh Circuit upheld the Selective Training and
Service Act's restrictions on judicial review of draft board decisions.41 0
Despite possible First Amendment and due process claims,4 1 Congress limited
the courts, and thus, the court could not review the board's decision.41 2 The
401. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,486 (1999)
(stating that protecting executive discretion from the court "can fairly be said to be the theme of
the [IIRIRA]").
402. See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text (explaining the IRIRA).
403. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 492 (vacating Ninth Circuit's judgment with instructions to
vacate the district court's decision due to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
404. See, e.g., Mapoy v. Carroll, 185 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
§ 1252(g) deprived district court ofjurisdiction over habeas petition); Hatami v. Ridge, 270 F.
Supp. 2d 763, 767 (E.D. Va. 2003) (same).
405. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449-50 (1850) (reversing lower court due to
Assignee Clause).
406. See Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 120 (1847) (dismissing due to amount in
controversy requirement).
407. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (concluding that
criminal jurisdiction is not within the lower courts' implied powers).
408. See supra notes 301-03 and accompanying text (explaining the limits on judicial
review contained in the Medicare Act).
409. See Am. Soc'y ofDermatologyv. Shalala, 962 F. Supp. 141,145-46 (D.D.C. 1996)
(outlining arguments that barring judicial review is unconstitutional, rejecting them, and
concluding that court lacked jurisdiction).
410. See United States v. Messersmith, 138 F.2d 599, 600 (7th Cir. 1943) (noting that the
Act (then 50 U.S.C. § 310(a)) limited review of local draft board decisions regarding
conscientious objectors).
411. See id. at 600-01 (summarizing defendant's ministerial and "arbitrary and capricious"
claims).
412. See id. at 601-02 (upholding the limit on judicial review and refusing to review
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Supreme Court sustained the Voting Rights Act provisions that funneled issues
exclusively to the District Court for the District of Columbia despite due
process objections. 3 According to Chief Justice Warren, Congress exercised
part of its power to "'ordain and establish' inferior federal tribunals" through
this law.414 The lower courts have followed the Supreme Court415 in upholding
the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act.416 The Supreme
Court also upheld limits on the remedies a lower court can issue,417 even when
the laws show dissatisfaction with the courts.
418
Hence, the case law supports Congress's authority to limit the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. It shows that Congress can restrict the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction and the lower courts' entire jurisdiction. Congress cannot
direct the results of a case, but it can limit jurisdiction for any reason. Also,
federal claims do not have to be brought in federal courts. Last, the case law
demonstrates how the courts have recognized Congress's Exceptions Clause
power.
In sum, Part III explains why laws that limit the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, laws like those before Congress, 419 are fully constitutional. First, these
laws comply with a plain reading of Article III because they simply remove a
certain class of cases from the court's jurisdiction.42° Second, they are
consistent with the principles that produced and were incorporated into the
Constitution, principles like checks and balances, legislative preeminence, and
skepticism of judicial power. 42' Third, these laws are consistent with the
Founders' intent that Congress use the Exceptions Clause to limit judicial
evidence).
413. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text (explaining the Voting Rights Act of
1965); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 318 (1966) (same); see also id at 301
(summarizing due process argument); id. at 332 (stating that Congress did not exceed its power
with this law).
414. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 331.
415. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,492 (1999)
(upholding IIRIRA).
416. See Mapoy v. Carroll, 185 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1999) (deciding that district court
lacked subject matterjurisdiction due to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)); Hatami v. Ridge, 270 F. Supp. 2d
763, 767 (E.D. Va. 2003) (same).
417. See Lockerty v. Philips, 319 U.S. 182, 188 (1943) (upholding Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942); Laufv. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938) (upholding the
Norris-LaGuardia Act).
418. See supra notes 282-86, 290-94, and accompanying text (explaining the Norris-La
Guardia Act and the Emergency Price Control Act).
419. See supra Part II (outlining the recent and pending legislation).
420. See supra Part III.A (interpreting Article III).
421. See supra Part III.B (surveying foundational principles).
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power.422 Fourth, these laws are consistent with Congress's consistent
understanding of its power, an understanding it has translated into action in
varying degrees many times.423 Fifth, these laws are consistent with federal
case law, which recognizes, upholds, and implements Congress's restrictions
on the jurisdiction of the lower courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.424 The consistent voices of the Constitution, the Founders, the
foundational principles, congressional practice, and court precedent all validate
Congress's power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts in the ways
proposed by the 108th and 109th Congresses.
IV. Common Constitutional Objections to Congress's Control
Part IV analyzes many of the common arguments against the
constitutionality of these proposals. While academic debate has produced a
plethora of theories and critiques, 425 this Part focuses on the objections lodged
against the bills proposed during the 108th and 109th Congresses.426
A. The Essential Function Theory
One of the earliest theoretical limits on Congress's power over federal
jurisdiction, the essential functions theory, alleges that Congress cannot use its
Exceptions Clause power to "destroy the essential role of the Supreme
Court.
' 4 27 While Henry Hart left the "essential role" undefined, others have
filled the void.428 Leonard Ratner argued that the Court must resolve
"inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of federal law by state and federal
429
courts," and "maintain the supremacy of federal law" against state challenges.
422. See supra Part III.C (outlining the Founding Fathers' debates regarding the
Exceptions Clause).
423. See supra Part III.D (explaining Congress's past limits on the federal courts'
jurisdiction).
424. See supra Part III.E (surveying the case law on Congress's power over federal
jurisdiction).
425. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 742 n.3 (listing academic literature on point); Velasco,
supra note 13, at 671 n.1 (same).
426. See Part II (explaining the recent and pending bills).
427. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953).
428. See id. (noting the impossibility of defining the essential functions).
429. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (1960).
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He reflected Holmes's belief that the Court must enforce the Supremacy
Clause.43° Critics of the recent bills posed several other essential functions: to
"uphold[] the Constitution, '" 43 to protect the rule of law,432 to bring uniformity
and supremacy to federal law,433 to protect personal freedoms,434 to protect
minorities, 435 and to serve as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.436
Each of the pending bills would destroy all of these functions. They give each
state supreme court the final word on marriage, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
public religious expression, and states would clearly respond differently.
Hence, these bills would violate this theory of the Constitution.
However, some have described the essential function theory as a "textual
phantom" and an example of "constitutional wishful thinking. "437 First, the
Constitution does not mention "essential functions," and neither did the
Founders when they discussed the Exceptions Clause.438 Neither Congress nor
the federal courts have recognized the theory when using or interpreting that
Clause.439 Hence, this theory lacks "textual and subsequentjudicial support."44°
430. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED PAPERS 295-96 (1920), quoted in
Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 10 (stating that nation would be in peril ifjudges could
not invalidate state laws).
431. THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS IN AMERICA'S COURTS 206,
217 (2002), quoted in H. REP. No. 108-691, at 96 (2004).
432. See, e.g., Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 14 (arguing that the Court's essential
function is to protect the rule of law).
433. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-614, at 54, 121, 139 (2004) (arguing that the Court's
essential function is ensuring uniformity and finality of federal law); Marriage Hearing, supra
note 295, at 14, 17 (statement of Michael Gerhardt) (same).
434. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-691, at 92 (arguing that courts are "the very protector of
those freedoms").
435. See, e.g., id. at 61-62, 71 (arguing that the judiciary protects minorities).
436. See, e.g., Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 16 (statement from Michael Gerhardt)
(arguing that one of the Court's essential functions is "to declare what the Constitution means").
437. Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 21, 24 (statements of Martin H. Redish).
438. See supra Parts III.A-C (noting neither Constitution nor Founders discussed this
idea); see also Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 73, at 910-11 (noting Ratner's lack of
historical support); Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 385, 410 (1983) (calling concept "wholly extraconstitutional").
439. See supra Part III.D-E (noting that Congress and courts do not recognize the theory);
see also Raoul Berger, Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's
"Court-Stripping" Polemic, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 611, 626 (1983) [hereinafter Berger, Judicial
Usurpation] (noting that Congress's refusal to give federal question jurisdiction and its
restrictions on the Supreme Court's habeas jurisdiction undermine the essential functions
theory).
440. S. Doc. 103-6, at 787, quoted in Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 50; see also
Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 73, at 908 (stating that the historical basis for the
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Second, the essential function theory is vague. For example, what is the
Court's essential function? The three early advocates of this theory provided
different answers, none of which match the congressional variants."44  Some
functions are inherently vague," 2 while others are less so.44 3 But if there is no
"judicially discoverable" standard for choosing a definition, then the theory is a
nonjusticiable political question and places no constraint on Congress. 4" The
sheer multiplicity of standards strongly indicates that no definition is
"constitutionally discernible."445
Third, this theory poses a choice between futility and contradiction. For
example, who determines whether a function is essential or non-essential? If
Congress decides, then the theory is useless. If the Court decides, then it is the
judge of its own power and essentially has unlimited power." 6 This would
contradict the Founders' devotion to checks and balances and would give
unlimited power, which they feared the most, to the branch they trusted the
least.447
Furthermore, the idea that the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme
Court, serve as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution and protector of
individual rights is both relatively novel448 and flawed.449 As the ultimate
essential functions test is "[a]t best ... speculative and at worst ... simply useless").
441. See Rossum, supra note 438, at 410-11 (noting Irving Brant's definition, preventing
"the destruction or infringement of any of the mandatory requirements of the Constitution";
Archibald Cox's definition, protecting "human rights"; and Paul Brest's definition, promoting
"individual rights and decision making through democratic processes").
442. See Hart, supra note 427, at 1365 (noting impossibility of defining essential
functions).
443. See supra notes 429,441 (giving Ratner's, Cox's, Brant's, and Brest's definitions of
essential functions).
444. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (setting out the factors for a
nonjusticiable political question); see also Velasco, supra note 13, at 679 (noting that Hart's
indeterminate definition would be nonjusticiable).
445. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (noting that multiplicity of standards
indicates none are "constitutionally discernible").
446. See Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 93 (written statement of Charles Rice)
(noting that this theory makes Court "final arbiter" of its power, making it "virtually unlimited");
Rossum, supra note 438, at 410 (same).
447. See supra Part III.B. 1 & III.B.3 (noting Founders' belief in checks and balances and
distrust of judiciary); see also Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 93 (written statement of
Charles Rice) (noting that if Founders intended to contradict checks and balances, they would
have made their intent explicit); Rossum, supra note 438, at 410 (same).
448. See, e.g., LARRYD. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTrrUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEw 7-8, 58 (2004), quoted in H. REP. No. 108-691, at 26 (2004) (pointing
out that the modem view of the judiciary as the final arbiter of the Constitution is of "relative
recent vintage"); Louis FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON THE
JUDICIARY 8-12 (1997), quoted in H. REP. No. 108-614, at 125 (2004) (same).
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expositor,45 ° the Court would have supreme power over the other branches.451
This would contradict all of the foundational principles.452 Principles aside, the
Founders clearly indicated that the courts were neither the voice of the
Constitution nor the guarantor of liberty.453 While the Supreme Court does
interpret the Constitution, it does so to resolve cases within its jurisdiction, not
to fulfill some special constitutional role.454
Setting aside the law, making the Court the Delphic oracle of the
Constitution is dangerous policy.4 55 While critics of the recent bills point to
school desegregation and interracial marriage cases, 4 56 they forget that the same
449. One might argue that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), gives the Court this
function. However, Marbury deals with the Supreme Court's role after it has jurisdiction over a
case. It does not apply to the question at hand-whether the Court has (or must have)
jurisdiction over certain cases. Furthermore, Marshall did not view the Court as creating law
through its decisions. Instead, he "assumed that 'law' was a universal body of principles" and
viewed judges as "merely stating 'what the law was."' See G. Edward White, Reflections on the
Role of the Supreme Court: The Contemporary Debate and Lessons offHistory, 63 JUDICATURE
162, 163 (1979), quoted in Virginia Armstrong, The Inevitability ofInseparability: Religion,
Ethics, and Federal Judicial Politics, 43 S. TEx. L. REv. 35, 58 (2001). In short, this was atask
of identifying the law, not creating it.
450. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (referring to the Supreme Court as
"ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969)
(same); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (stating "the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution").
451. But see supra Part III.B.2 & III.B.3.a-b (noting the Founders' belief in legislative
preeminence and their belief that judiciary was weaker than Congress and the weakest of the
three branches).
452. See supra Part III.B.2-3 (outlining the principles of legislative preeminence and
judicial skepticism); see also Berger, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 439, at 645-46 (same).
453. See supra Part III.B.3.d (noting Founders' insistence that judiciary was not ultimate
arbiter or enforcer of rights); see also Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005 (1965) ("Congress has the power by enactment of a statute to strike
at what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of the jurisdiction of the lower courts and of
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.").
454. See Wechsler, supra note 453, at 1006 (noting that federal courts handle
constitutional questions as part of resolving cases in their jurisdiction, not because of a special
function); see also United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947) (stating that the
Court interprets the Constitution only in contests between litigants); Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 52 (1971) (same).
455. See KRAMER, supra note 448, at 228-29, cited in H. REP. No. 108-691, at 29 (2004)
(recounting negative examples of judicial action). See generally STEPHEN P. POWERS &
STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH?: CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
(2002) (using social science evidence to show how "judicial intervention in public policy has
often brought undesirable consequences," even for the groups that the courts intended to
benefit).
456. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-69 1, at 70 (using Loving v. Virginia and Brown v. Bd of
Ed. to argue against H.R. 2028); H. REP. No. 108-614, at 122 (2004) (arguing the same for H.R.
3313).
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Court blocked abolition efforts,457 blessed segregation, 45 8 impeded social
welfare legislation, 459 and allowed Japanese internment. 460 Many people-
including some conservatives461-applauded when Attorney General Bill Pryor
enforced the federal court order against Roy Moore, thus equating court
decisions with the Constitution and disobedience to the courts with disregard
for the law.462 But when Stephen Douglas voices the same ideas to defend the
Supreme Court on slavery, they assume a less attractive hue.46 3 Hence, one
must remember that the Constitution and the Supreme Court are distinct, and
the latter neither defines nor outranks the former.4 4
Moreover, producing uniformity is not the federal courts' "essential
function" under the Constitution. First, this is a policy argument at best, not a
constitutional one. Though the federal courts can provide uniform federal law,
this unwritten consequence does not trump the text of Article 1I.465 Uniformity
is a by-product of resolving cases within the Court's jurisdiction, not an
466inherent function. Most likely, even Justice Story viewed uniformity as
457. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 451-52 (1856) (affirming slavery as
constitutional).
458. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding racial segregation in
railroad cars).
459. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (invalidating limits on bakery
workday length).
460. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (affirming Japanese
internment).
461. See, e.g., R. Albert Mohler, Jr., The Battle of Montgomery: Where Should Christians
Stand?, http://www.lifeway.coni/Iwc/article-main-page/0, 1 703,A%253D 154838 0/2526M%253
D 150019,00.html (noting disapproval of Moore's actions from Dr. Richard Land and Dr. Albert
Mohler of the Southern Baptist Convention and from Jay Sekulow of the American Center for
Law and Justice) (last visited May 10, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
462. See David Mattingly, Judge Suspended over Ten Commandments, Aug. 23, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/22/ten.commandments/index.html (noting the controversy
surrounding Judge Roy Moore's actions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
463. See 3 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 9 (Roy
Basler ed., 1953) (quoting Douglas on how Supreme Court determines the law). But see id. at
268 (noting Lincoln's view that a judicial decision is final for a given case, but stating that
Supreme Court does not irrevocably fix policy).
464. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605, 630-33 (1981) (stating that supremacy of federal law does not always
require that federal courts be supreme).
465. See Rossum, supra note 438, at 389 (pointing out that those who oppose Congress's
power to make exceptions must deny an explicit textual provision in favor of the implied power
ofjudicial review).
466. See Wechsler, supra note 453, at 1006 (noting Court's primary role of deciding cases
in its jurisdiction).
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"desirable policy" rather than "constitutional command" because he wanted
467Congress to expand the Judiciary Act. Federal courts do not have to hear all
federal cases.468 The Founders regarded uniformity as dispensable,469
especially if the alternative was unrestrained power.470 This may not often be
wise policy, but unwise policy is not always unconstitutional.47'
Second, even as policy, the uniformity argument is flawed. Leaving issues
in the federal court system does not automatically unify the law. It merely
reduces the number of patches in the quilt until the Supreme Court speaks
because the lower courts decisions have a limited scope.472 Also limiting
jurisdiction does not completely defeat the interest in uniformity because
Congress can always reinstate it. Holmes's uniformity argument4 73 simply
requires that "Congress have the power to check the states," not that Congress
be required to use it.
474
In sum, the essential functions theory lacks support, violates the
Constitution's foundational principles, and may be uselessly vague. Also, the
proposed essential functions contradict the Founders and their guiding
principles, as well as confuse policy with constitutionality. Therefore, this
"textual phantom" does not endanger the proposed legislation.
475
B. The Mandatory Jurisdiction Theory
Despite its several mutations, the mandatory jurisdiction theory insists that
Article III requires that Congress vest the entire judicial power somewhere in
the federal court system. Story first articulated the theory,476 but it remained
467. Gunther, supra note 13, at 903.
468. See supra Part III.E.3 (noting that federal courts do not have to hear all federal
claims).
469. See Berger, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 439, at 628 (arguing that Judiciary Act,
habeas limits, and The Federalist show that the Founders viewed uniformity as dispensable).
470. See id. at 644 (arguing that the Framers departed from uniformity and that "nothing
exceeded [their] dread of unrestrained power").
471. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (noting the difference between policy
and the Constitution).
472. See H. REP. No. 108-614, at 34 (2004) (noting that federal courts do not automatically
establish uniformity).
473. See supra note 430 (noting Holmes's view).
474. Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 73, at 909.
475. Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 21,24 (statements of Martin Redish).
476. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 331 (1816) (stating that "whole judicial
power.., should be... vested either in an original or appellate form" in federal courts); 3
STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 135, § 1696 (arguing that Article III at least requires that
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rejected for almost two centuries. 47 Some argue that federal review must be
available for all constitutional claims.478 Thus, Congress could remove a case
from either the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction or the lower courts'
jurisdiction, but not both.4 79 Others argue that the Constitution requires
Congress to give federal courts jurisdiction over almost every type of case or
controversy listed in Article 111.480 Either way, the three major bills before the
108th and 109th Congresses would fail this test because they remove
constitutional issues from the federal court system.48 1 Professor Amar argues
that federal courts must have jurisdiction over federal question, admiralty, and
public ambassador cases (first-tier cases), but may also hear the other types of
cases and controversies (second-tier cases).482 This version allows Congress to
limit federal appeals for the second-tier cases, but it prevents Congress from
excluding first-tier cases from the federal system. 483 Amar's variation gives
Congress more leeway, but critics of the recent bills combined his and Story's
theories. 4 84 Even under Amar, the three recent bills would fail because they
remove first-tier constitutional cases completely from the federal court
system.485
However, this mandatory jurisdiction theory lacks historical support. The
debates over the Exceptions Clause do not reveal any support for this two-tiered
notion, and neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has utilized it.486 Neither
federal courts hear the cases preceded by "all" in Article III).
477. See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
27 VILL. L. REv. 1030, 1035 (1982), quoted in Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article 111: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 270-71
(1985) [hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist] (noting that Story's theory "no longer deserves to be
taken seriously").
478. See Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control
Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 143, 144 (1982)
[hereinafter Redish, Constitutional Limitations] (summarizing Sager's position).
479. See id. at 145 (summarizing consequences of Sager's argument).
480. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 749-50 (summarizing the thesis of this article).
481. See Part II (showing that all bills remove constitutional claims from all federal courts).
482. See Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 477, at 208-10 (summarizing two-tier thesis).
483. See id. at 255 (summarizing the effect of two-tier theory on Congress's use of its
exceptions power).
484. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-614, at 149-51 (2004) (citing Story and Amar against H.R.
3313); Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 141 (letter from Michael Gerhardt) (same).
485. See Part II (showing that all bills remove constitutional claims from all federal courts).
486. See Berger, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 439, at 632-33 (noting that neither
Article III's legislative history, the Judiciary Act of 1789, nor 175 years of Supreme Court
rulings support Sager's (and by extension Amar's) theory); see also supra Part III.C-E (same).
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Sager487 nor Amar488 points to any concrete evidence that undermines
Congress's power or shows that the Founders believed this theory. Even Story
forms a weak foundation for the theory because many of his statements were
tentative. 489 Yet, Amar argues that the Judiciary Act of 1789 supports his two-
tiered theory.490 He alleges that the purported limits on Supreme Court review
in Section 25 formed an "optical illusion" that fooled the Court.49' Yet Chief
Justice Marshall and others dismissed cases due to Section 25, and Congress
ultimately repealed this limit. 492 The contrast between this thin support 493 and
the consistent view of the Founders, Congress, and the Supreme Court erodes
an already weak theory. 9"
Moreover, the mandatory theory poses several textual problems. Under
this theory, the Vesting and Extending Clauses of Article III command
Congress to give the federal courts jurisdiction over "all cases" and some of the
"controversies" listed in Section 2."9 As a result, Amar argues that if Congress
makes an exception for a first-tier case, it must create another court to hear that
case. 496  First, this argument overlooks the fact that other constitutional
provisions use the same language as the Vesting Clause in a non-mandatory
487. See Redish, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 478, at 146 (showing that Sager's
historical evidence does not undermine Congress's power); Gunther, supra note 13, at 915
(same).
488. See Casto, Orthodox View, supra note 62, at 91 (noting the lack of direct evidence
that anyone associated with "the framing, ratification, or initial implementation of the
Constitution" followed the two-tier thesis).
489. See Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L.
REv. 45, 59 (1975-76) (noting lack of support for Story); Casto, Orthodox View, supra note 62,
at 92 (showing that Story's statements were tentative).
490. See Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 477, at 259-65 (applying two-tier thesis to
Judiciary Act of 1789).
491. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure ofthe JudiciaryAct of1789,138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1499, 1531 (1990) (noting that Supreme Court failed to see the "optical illusion" in
Section 25).
492. See supra notes 391-92 and accompanying text (noting how Supreme Court upheld
and used Section 25).
493. See Harrison, supra note 52, at 247 ("If [Amar] is correct, the text waited almost two
hundred years for its true interpreter."); see also Casto, Orthodox View, supra note 62, at 94
(stating that only two people in 200 years have given Amar's theory any credence).
494. See supra Part III (noting consistency of Constitution, its principles, Founders,
Congress, and courts).
495. See Clinton, supra note 13, at 749-50 (arguing that "shall" in Article III is a
mandatory term); Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 477, at 231-35 (same).
496. See Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 477, at 255 (arguing that Congress can make an
exception from the Court's appellate jurisdiction for a first-tier case only if it creates another
Article III body to hear that case).
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fashion.497 Second, this theory fails to distinguish between "jurisdiction" and
"the judicial power., 498 Even if the Vesting and Extending Clauses were
commands, they deal with the judicial power. When Article III says the Court
"shall have appellate jurisdiction," that jurisdiction is subject to Congress's
exceptions. 499 Third, Amar argues that Congress can remove controversies
from the federal system, but not cases. 500 Yet the Exceptions Clause
contradicts this view by using the term "cases."501 Also, anytime Congress
removes a controversy, it has also removed a case because controversies are
merely types of cases.50 2 Fourth, under this theory, Congress could not exercise
its Exceptions Clause power unless it first created the lower courts, even though
the language of the Exceptions Clause contains no such condition.50 3 In sum,
because this theory focuses so much on a few words, it fails to give a coherent
picture of Article 111. 504 Given these problems, this theory poses no serious
threat to bills like those considered in the 108th and 109th Congresses.
C. Separation of Powers
Critics of the recent bills argue that limiting federal jurisdiction violates
the separation of powers. First, they allege that the bills allow Congress to
undermine federal courts by infringing on their historical role as the ultimate
expositor of the Constitution and the defender of personal liberties. 50 5 By
preventing the Court from invalidating a potentially unconstitutional law,
497. See Velasco, supra note 13, at 697-700, 702-04 (showing that other provisions use
"shall" as a self-executing term); Harrison, supra note 52, at 211-12, 216-17 (same).
498. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (distinguishing "judicial power" and
"jurisdiction").
499. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
500. See supra note 482 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress may treat cases and
controversies differently).
501. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
502. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (distinguishing "cases" and
"controversies").
503. See Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of
Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1633, 1637-38 (1990) (noting that Amar's theory contradicts a
"holistic" view of Article III, which allows Congress not to create lower courts and still make
exceptions to Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction).
504. See id. at 1636 (arguing that Amar is guilty of selective literalism, focusing too much
on certain words to the exclusion of the rest of the provision).
505. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-614, at 30, 103, 121, 136(2004) (arguing that H.R. 3313
violates the separation of powers by undermining courts' role as the Constitution's ultimate
interpreter); Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 142 (letter from Michael Gerhardt) (stating
that separation of powers prevents Congress from using its power to undermine courts).
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Congress undermines its constitutional function. 50 6 Second, they insist that the
bills allow Congress to expand its power by influencing decisions. 50 7 Third,
they argue that the bills allow Congress to bypass the proper mechanisms for
constitutional change: constitutional amendments, appointing new judges, and
appellate review.508
Though this objection sounds constitutional, it suffers from four flaws.
First, it rests on suspect assumptions. It falsely assumes that the Court serves as
the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution's meaning and as the protector of
individual rights.s 9 Yet Chief Justice Marshall knew that he did not undermine
the Court's role when he dismissed cases because Congress had not granted
jurisdiction.5 10 This objection also assumes that these bills expand Congress's
power. But they neither allow Congress to decide cases nor mandate that the
courts reach particular outcomes. 51 They simply prevent federal courts from
hearing certain cases.
5 12
Second, the separation of powers objection relies on a "superficial
understanding" of this principle.5 13 The Founders did not isolate each branch
from the others.51 4 Instead, they set up a government of "separated institutions
sharing powers.5 15 Hence, interaction between Congress and the judiciary
506. See, e.g., Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 14, 74 (noting Gerhardt's statement
that using a power to undermine the effectiveness of another branch violates separation of
powers).
507. See Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at It (statement of Michael Gerhardt)
(arguing that H.R. 3799 opens the door to allowing Congress to direct results in cases); H. REP.
No. 108-614, at 150-51 (same).
508. See Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 8-9 (statement of Michael Gerhardt)
(arguing that H.R. 3799 does not satisfy proper means of constitutional change); H. REP. No.
108-614, at 136 (noting that constitutional change only occurs via amendments or judicial
decisions); Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 15 (same).
509. See supra Part III.B.3.d (discussing the role of the Court).
510. See supra notes 391-92 and accompanying text (showing that Marshall and others
implemented limits on the Court's jurisdiction); see also H. REP. No. 108-614, at 16 (noting that
this happened after Marbury v. Madison).
511. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-614, at 18, 37,47 (2004) (noting that H.R. 3313 does not
dictate results or transfer judicial power to the Congress); H. REP. No. 108-691, at 24 (2004)
(same); Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 73, at 923 (noting that Congress cannot give
the Court jurisdiction and direct it to rule in a given way).
512. See supra notes 363-66 and accompanying text (noting that Congress can prevent the
courts from speaking but cannot tell them how to speak).
513. Rossum, supra note 438, at 414.
514. See supra Parts III.B. 1 (showing the interaction between separation of powers and
checks and balances).
515. Rossum, supra note 438, at 414 (quoting R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 33
(1960)).
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poses a problem only if Congress were "to exclude federal court jurisdiction
and itself attempt to adjudicate individual cases. 516 Because these bills do not
overturn decisions, adjudicate cases, or mandate results, they do not violate the
separation of powers.517
Third, this objection disregards the twin principle of separation of
powers-checks and balances. The Founders implemented this principle to
restrain governmental power by giving each branch weapons for its
constitutional self-defense.1 8 This principle alone indicates that Congress must
have a means of combating the judiciary's power ofjudicial review, something
that the other foundational principles also emphasize. 519 Not only do the
Founders' statements confirm that the Exceptions Clause fills this role,520 but so
does Herbert Wechsler, a noted scholar of federal jurisdiction.52'
Fourth, this separation of powers objection assumes that only judicial
appointments, amendments, and appellate review check the judiciary. While
constitutional amendments can accomplish this, they are not Congress's check;
they belong to the people for use against the whole government. 522 Likewise,
appellate review does not check judicial power. It allows the courts to exercise
self-restraint, but the Founders did not rely on the "parchment barriers" of self-
restraint. 523 To qualify as a legitimate restraint, one entity must apply the
mechanism against another.524 While judicial appointments are a way for
516. Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 25 (statement of Martin Redish); see also id at
22 (noting that separation of powers prevents Congress from hearing cases, directing results, or
overturning cases).
517. See id. at 22, 25, 77 (noting that separation of powers problems are unlikely if
Congress completely excludes federal court jurisdiction over a category of cases).
518. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 8, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton); see also supra
Part III.B. I (showing need for checks and balances).
519. See supra Part III.B (explaining how the foundational principles affect Congress's
dealings with the courts).
520. See supra Part III.C (noting the Founders' statements on the purpose and effect of the
Exceptions Clause).
521. See Wechsler, supra note 453, at 1005 (noting that that under the Exceptions Clause,
"Congress has the power by enactment of a statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by
delimitations of the jurisdiction of the lower courts and of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction").
522. See also Berger, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 439, at 625 (criticizing the
amendment argument because it seeks to trump the text of Article III, § 2, with the implied
power of "activist judicial review").
523. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 8, at 331 (James Madison).
524. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 8, at 346-47 (James Madison) (discussing the
need for each branch to restrain the others); see also id at 347-49 (noting that the Constitution
made ambition counteract ambition "to control the abuses of government" through the three
branches and federalism); THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 8, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton)
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Congress to limit the judiciary, they are a very indirect control. In light of the
Founders' fear of unlimited power, skepticism toward the judiciary, and belief
in legislative preeminence,525 it is hard to believe that they would have left
Congress only one very attenuated means of "self-defence.
5 26
D. Judicial Independence
Opponents of these jurisdiction limiting bills criticize the legislation for
eroding judicial independence. 527 Like some academics, 52 8 congressional
critics argue that these bills undermine federal judges' independence from
Congress, which is essential if the courts are to check Congress and protect the
freedoms of minorities. 529 They point out that the Founders insisted upon an
independent judiciary5 30 and warned against a dependent one.
531
This theory, however, poses constitutional problems. First, it essentially
equates judicial independence with unrestrained autonomy, which is a suspect
definition of the concept. During the Founding era, independence applied only
to decisions, not jurisdiction.532 The Founders used the term to indicate that
(remarking on the "insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation" and the need for each branch
to have "constitutional and effectual power of self-defence").
525. See supra Part III.B (explaining these foundational principles).
526. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 8, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton); Berger, Judicial
Usurpation, supra note 439, at 645. Critics might argue that this "unchecked powers" argument
works both ways because the Exceptions Clause leaves Congress with unrestrained power. But
this oversimplifies the matter. To limit the Court, Congress must clear the hurdles of the
legislative process, with all the compromise that entails. Then the President must sign the law.
Furthermore, the people check Congress's Exceptions Clause power through elections. Thus,
although the Court cannot check this power, Congress is by no means unrestrained.
527. See H. REP. No. 108-614, at 155 (2004) (arguing that H.R. 3313 undermines the
independence of the federal judiciary); H. REP. No. 108-691, at 73, 100-05 (2004) (same for
H.R. 2028).
528. See, e.g., Redish, ConstitutionalLimitations, supra note 478, at 149 (tracing Sager's
use the salary and tenure protections of Article III to argue against the Exceptions Clause);
Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 477, at 235 (incorporating the "structural superiority of
federal judges" into his two-tier theory).
529. See H. REP. No. 108-691, at 70, 101, 103 (arguing thatjudicial independence protects
minorities); H. REP. No. 108-614, at 36 (arguing that judicial independence checks Congress).
530. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-614, at 156-57 (citing Madison and Hamilton for judicial
independence).
531. See H. REP. No. 108-614, at 50 (quoting John Marshall on the dangers of a dependent
judiciary).
532. See Berger, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 439, at 627 ("Independence requires that
judges be left free to decide causes committed to them; it has no relevance to what jurisdiction
must be conferred upon them.").
1206
JURISDICTION WITHDRAWAL
other branches could not control or influence a judge's decisions,533 and thus,
independence referred to salary and tenure protection, not a guaranteed scope
ofjurisdiction.534 In fact, the Constitution's opponents feared that it gave the
courts unfettered autonomy, a charge its supporters vigorously denied.535 To
both sides, though, a dependent judiciary meant that another branch controlled
or influenced its decisions.536 In addition, the Founders used the term
"independence" to describe the executive branch,537 and yet Congress and the
538courts clearly limit the president's powers. Hence, Congress can also limit
judges without rendering them dependent. Judicial independence simply
underscores the difference between removing jurisdiction and influencing
decisions. Congress does not violate a judge's independence as long as it
forbids him from speaking to a given issue at all.539 As the 109th Congress's
bills satisfy this requirement, they do not compromise judicial independence.
Second, judicial independence advocates forget to balance this principle
with the foundational principle of checks and balances. Judicial independence
cannot mean unfettered autonomy because the Constitution recognizes no
533. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 8, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton)
(defining judicial dependence as "being overpowered, awed, or influenced" by the other
branches); 2 ELLIOTT, supra note 85, at 480 (showing that James Wilson defined judicial
dependence as a judge altering his rulings to please the legislature so as to retain office).
534. See FARRAND 1937, supra note 102, reprinted in 4 FoUNDERS',supra note 63, at 133-
39 (tracing debate over Article III and showing that salary and tenure protection secure judicial
independence); 2 ELLIOTT, supra note 85, at 480 (noting that tenure protection promotes
independence); Webster, Examination, supra note 230, in FRIENDS, supra note 84, at 380
(same); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 8, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) (same); 3 ELLIOT,
supra note 85, at 517 (showing that tenure and salary protection promote independence); 1
WILSON, WORKS, supra note 124, at, at 326-31, quoted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 252
(same); DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 131, at 133 (same); THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 8,
at 528 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that salary protection promotes independence); DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 131, at 133 (same).
535. See supra Part III.B (outlining the opponents' arguments against the judiciary).
536. See supra note 534 and accompanying text (defining judicial independence); see also
FEDERAL FARMER, No. 15, in 2 STORING, supra note 121, at 188, quoted in 4 FOUNDERS', supra
note 63, at 140 (arguing that the Constitution's salary protections were not sufficient to protect
judicial independence).
537. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 8, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing
the president's independence from Congress in terms of his salary protections).
538. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (stating that veto power is subject to override);
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that treaty and appointment powers are subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-07
(1974) (noting that the judiciary limits executive privilege); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,
700-03 (1997) (same).
539. See supra notes 363-66 and accompanying text (showing that Congress can force the
courts to remain silent, but it cannot tell them what to say).
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unchecked powers.540 Hence, it also recognizes no self-checked powers.54'
Instead, the Founders gave each branch the tools for constitutional "self-
defence. 5 42 While the courts limit Congress with judicial review, this would
give the judiciary more power than Congress if it remained unchecked.543
Thus, they gave Congress power over the limits of jurisdiction.
544
By way of analogy, the federal courts are like a horse in a pasture. As the
horse cannot roam the prairies like a wild mustang, 45 the pasture must be
fenced, and the Constitution determines the outer and inner boundaries of this
fence.546 The horse is independent in that he can roam anywhere inside the
fence. The rancher cannot dictate where the horse will eat, either by
command,547 threat,541 or promise of reward.549 But the rancher can move the
fence, thereby restricting the horse's access to an area he once enjoyed. When
this happens, the horse has lost his independence only if independence means
the ability to eat in the now off-limits territory. This would be a particularly
strange definition, especially as the rancher has allowed the horse to roam and
graze on vast tracts that had remained off limits for over a century.550 Now he
simply wants to reclaim a few acres of this new territory. 5'
E. The Bill of Rights
Many people also argue that the Bill of Rights limits Congress's power to
limit federal court jurisdiction. They insist that the Bill of Rights removes
540. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing checks and balances).
541. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (showing that the Founders structured
each branch to restrain the others).
542. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (showing that the Founders structured
each branch to restrain the others).
543. But see supra Part III.B (noting foundational principles).
544. See supra Part III.C (noting Founders' statements regarding the Exceptions Clause).
545. See supra Part III.B. 1 (showing that the Constitution allows no unchecked powers).
546. See supra notes 328-37, 367-78 and accompanying text (showing that the outer
boundary is the constitutional maximum for the Supreme Court's original and appellate
jurisdiction and that the inner boundary is the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which
Congress cannot take away).
547. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80U.S. 128, 147 (1871) (noting that Congress could
not direct the Court as to how it should treat a presidential pardon).
548. See U.S. CONST. art. III., § 1 (giving judges tenure during their good behavior).
549. See id. (giving judges salary protection).
550. See supra Part III.D. I (chronicling past limits on federal question jurisdiction).
551. See Part II (listing the recent and pending legislation).
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issues from the political process entirely so as to protect minorities.552 Yet the
recent bills prevent federal courts from enforcing the rights of some citizens.553
The Bill of Rights forms an external limit on Congress's power over
jurisdiction, 54 but these bills would allow Congress to sidestep it through
ordinary legislation.555 As Professor Gerhardt noted, "Congress cannot exercise
any of its powers under the Constitution... in a manner that violates the
Constitution. 55 6 And if Congress can prevent a person from vindicating his
First Amendment rights, it might insulate other legislation from review and
place a host of rights in jeopardy.557
However, this argument depends on several shaky assumptions. First, it
assumes that unless a federal court hears a case, then those rights remain
unprotected. But the federal courts are not the guarantors of personal
freedoms. 558 If they were, then they should have full constitutional jurisdiction,
but this has never been true. 59 The Founders primarily relied on competing
interests in society and on federalism to protect freedoms.5 60 State courts are
not only fully capable of protecting individual liberties, 61 they may also be
562their primary guarantors.
Second, by equating constitutional decisions with the Constitution, the Bill
of Rights objection presumes that "the Constitution is what the judges say it
is."'563 The Founders did not agree with this, 564 and neither did most of this
552. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-691, at 61-62 (2004) (arguing that Bill of Rights removed
subjects from the majority).
553. See, e.g., id. at 97 (arguing that H.R. 2028 prevents courts from hearing any claim that
government's use of Pledge violates First Amendment).
554. See H. REP. No. 108-614, at 35, 147 (2004) (arguing that the Bill of Rights limits
Congress's Exceptions Clause power); see also Hart, supra note 427, at 1372 (arguing that the
rest of the Constitution limits Congress's power).
555. See Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 5, 13 (arguing that Congress is evading the
Bill of Rights).
556. Id. at 94.
557. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-691, at 60, 66, 68, 79, 83, 102-03 (making abuse of power
argument).
558. See supra Part III.B.3.d (noting that the courts are not the guarantors of freedom).
559. See IDES & MAY, supra note 258 (noting that Congress has never given the federal
judiciary the full jurisdiction described in Article III, § 2).
560. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 8, at 350 (James Madison) (noting that a
multiplicity of interests prevents majoritarian abuses).
561. See Rossum, supra note 438, at 420 (noting that state courts satisfy due process
requirements).
562. See Hart, supra note 427, at 1401 (noting that state courts are "primary guarantors of
constitutional rights").
563. CHARLES EvANs HUGHES, THE AUTOBIoGRAPHIcAL NOTEs OF CHARLES EvANS HUGHES
144 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973), quoted in BARTON, supra note 78, at
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nation's leaders through history. 565  This would elevate the Court above
Congress and the Constitution, contrary to that document's foundational
principles.566  Ironically, proponents of this argument attempt to trump
Congress's explicit, textual power to make exceptions with the implied doctrine
ofjudicial review.567 But the Constitution and federal courts are not the same,
568and only the former is supreme.
Third, when advocates of this objection argue that Congress might abuse
its exceptions power, they prove nothing. During the Founding era, many
objected to federal power for this reason, but the Founders dismissed the
argument because it applied equally to any constitution. 569 The argument
applies equally to the President's executive privilege or commander in chief
duties. Congress arguably came close to abusing its impeachment power with
President Andrew Johnson, 570 but its power is still constitutional. The Supreme
Court might occasionally abuse its power ofjudicial review, 571 but these abuses
230.
564. See supra Part III.B.3 (showing Founders' distrust of the judiciary and of judicial
discretion).
565. See H. REP. No. 108-691, at 29-30 (2004) (citing presidents, such as F. Roosevelt,
who, throughout history, questioned judiciary's role as ultimate interpreter); Louis FISHER,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON THE JUDICIARY 8-12 (1997), in H. REP.
No. 108-614, at 125 (2004) (noting Supreme Court claimed the role of ultimate arbiter in
twentieth century and quoting various justices, including Warren and Ginsburg, who question
this role).
566. See supra Part III.B.2-3 (noting the principles of legislative preeminence and judicial
skepticism).
567. See also Berger, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 439, at 625 (criticizing other
arguments that seek to trump Article III, § 2, with the implied power of "activist judicial
review"); Rossum, supra note 438, at 389 (same).
568. See Bator, supra note 464, at 633 (noting that the Constitution, not federal courts, are
supreme).
569. See James Iredell, Marcus, Answers to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New
Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-88 at 342-44 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1968), quoted in 4
FOUNDERS', supra note 63, at 233 (noting the meaninglessness of the abuse argument); 3
ELLIOTT, supra note 85, at 536 (noting Madison's similar comments).
570. See, e.g., SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT 1776-2004, at 171-74 (4th ed., 2004) (chronicling the Radical Republicans'
attack on executive authority and summarizing the severe consequences that President
Johnson's conviction would have had on the "power and prestige of the presidency" and the
checks and balances of the Constitution); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE
HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 250,
269-70, 278 (1992) (observing how the conviction of President Johnson would have
significantly undermined the independence of the presidency).
571. See, e.g., Berger, Judicial Usurpation, supra note 439, at 632-42 (arguing that the
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do not nullify the power.572 While this abuse argument may create good sound
bites, it is a tautology that proves nothing.
F. Due Process & Equal Protection
Critics of the proposed legislation also argue that due process and equal
protection restrict Congress's power to limit federal court jurisdiction.
573
Allegedly, procedural due process requires that a federal court be available to
hear federal claims either originally or on appeal.574 Because state courts are
neither as sympathetic to federal claims nor as independent as federal courts,
they insufficiently protect constitutional rights.575 Furthermore, critics insist
that these laws violate equal protection by placing an undue burden on a
specific class of litigants without a rational basis.576 The pending bills hinder
homosexuals or religious minorities from seeking constitutional protection,
which "is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense." 577 That is, these laws violate equal protection because they are based
either on a suspect classification or impinge a fundamental right, and Congress
had no neutral motive for doing so.578 Similarly, they allege that although
Congress can regulate the judiciary for neutral reasons, it violates substantive
due process if its measures lack a neutral justification.579 Of course, "[n]either
Court has abused its power of judicial review); BARTON, supra note 78, at 262 (same);
SCHLAFLY, supra note 6, at 5 (same).
572. See, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at 372-74 (defending the original
understanding ofjudicial review); BARTON, supra note 78, at 257-58 (same).
573. See Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 73, 87, 144 (arguing that equal protection
and due process limit Congress's power to pass H.R. 3313).
574. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-691, at 68, 71-72 (2004) (arguing that a federal court must
be available to hear federal claims); Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 13-14 (statement of
Michael Gerhardt) (same).
575. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-691, at 99 (arguing that state courts are inadequate for
defending constitutional rights); Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 10, 13-14 (statement
of Michael Gerhardt) (same).
576. See H. REP. No. 108-691, at 98-99 (arguing that H.R. 2028 violates equal protection);
Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Michael Gerhardt) (same for H.R.
3799); H. REP. No. 108-614, at 46, 115-16 (2004) (same for H.R. 3313); Marriage Hearing,
supra note 295, at 14, 18 (same).
577. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996), quoted in H. REP. No. 108-614, at 152.
578. See Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 14, 19-20, 71-72, 75, 77, 83 (arguing that
Congress must have a neutral justification for its restriction and that distrust of a class or of
judges is not neutral).
579. See Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Michael Gerhardt)
(arguing that Congress's lack of a neutral justification may violate Fifth Amendment due
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mistrust of the federal judiciary nor hostility to particular substantive judicial
decisions" satisfies this requirement. 80
However, a due process or equal protection limit would contradict checks
and balances. Both friends and foes of the Marriage Protection Act recognized
that a proposed due process and equal protection exception would have gutted
the bill and given the Court unfettered discretion over whether the limit was
proper.581 This is because the concept is so vague that it covers anything and is
essentially a judicial "wildcard. 5 82  Justice Frankfurter explained that it
requires judges to make "a judgment that reflects deep, even if inarticulate,
feelings of our society. 5 83 If this were not nebulous enough to give the Court
unfettered discretion, descriptions of substantive due process such as
"penumbras formed by emanations, 5 84 "emerging awareness, 5 85 "evolving
paradigm,"5 86 and "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life, 5 87 amply fill in the
void. As such autonomy would make the Court the judge of its own power, a
due process or equal protection limit violates the principle of checks and
balances.588
In addition, the proposed due process limitation erroneously assumes that
due process requires a federal trial or appeal, 589 an argument that even Herbert
Wechsler rejected as "antithetical to the plan of the Constitution for the
courts. ' 59° Due process may require an independent judicial hearing, but a state
process); see also H. REP. No. 108-691, at 98-99 (noting need for a neutral justification); H.
REP. No. 108-614, at 152-54 (same).
580. Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Michael Gerhardt); see also
H. REP. No. 108-691, at 98-99 (2004) (noting that distrust of judiciary is not a neutral
justification); H. REP. No. 108-614, at 152-54 (same).
581. See H. REP. No. 108-614, at 47, 53-54, 116-17 (noting that the proposed due process
and equal protection amendment to H.R. 3313 would gut the bill).
582. W. Forrester, Are We Readyfor Truth in Judging?, 63 AM. BAR AsS'N J. 1212 (1977),
quoted in SCHLAFLY, supra note 6, at 10.
583. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 603 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. concurring), quoted in
BERGER, GOVERNMENT, supra note 83, at 283.
584. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
585. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
586. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003).
587. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
588. See supra Part III.B. 1 (showing the Founders' insistence on checks and balances).
589. See supra Part III.E.3 (showing that not every federal claim requires federal trial); see
also Gunther, supra note 13, at 915 (noting that due process does not require "afederaljudicial
forum"); Velasco, supra note 13, at 692-93 (noting that state court adjudication satisfies due
process).
590. Wechsler, supra note 453, at 1005.
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proceeding amply satisfies this.i9' The Founders rejected arguments that state
judges could not be trusted with federal constitutional claims, 592 and the case
law shows that federal judges do not have to hear every federal claim. 593 The
law presumes that state courts can hear federal and constitutional questions
unless specified otherwise; 594 in some cases, it forces states to hear federal
claims.595 For many years, state courts were the final word on some
constitutional claims.596 Justice Brennan once declared: "But, of course,
virtually all matters that might be heard in Art. III courts could also be left by
Congress to the state courts.
5 9 7 Not only has Congress done this in the past,
5 98
but the Court has upheld these provisions.
Furthermore, advocates of the due process limit erroneously assume that
all constitutional violations must have a judicial remedy. 600 But the federal
courts cannot review contested congressional elections, political questions, or
claims covered by sovereign immunity.60' Other constitutional violations are
591. See supra Part III.E.3 (showing that not every federal claim requires a federal trial);
see also Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 73, at 915 (noting that state court
adjudication will satisfy due process); Velasco, supra note 13, at 692-93 (same).
592. See 3 ELLiOTr, supra note 85, at 553-54 (noting Marshall's assurance that the state
courts would not lose jurisdiction under the Constitution); THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note
8, at 552 (Alexander Hamilton) (same).
593. See supra Part III.E.3 (showing that not all federal claims require a federal trial).
594. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,477-78 (1981) (pronouncing
general principle that state courts may exercise jurisdiction over a federal cause of action unless
specified to the contrary), Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455,459 (1990) (recognizing the "deeply
rooted presumption" in favor of concurrent state jurisdiction over federal claims); see also Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (explaining that the Court will not presume state
courts have less sensitivity to federal rights than federal courts); Part III.D.1 & III.E.3 (noting
that state courts heard federal claims Congress had not given to federal courts).
595. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356,369-70 (1990) (stating that state courts must hear
federal claims "when the parties and controversy are properly before it, in the absence of a 'valid
excuse"').
596. See supra notes 391-94, 400-04, and accompanying text (showing that state courts
can have the final word on constitutional issues).
597. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,64 n.15 (1982); see
also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (noting that Congress could have
"routed all federal constitutional questions through the state court systems" with Supreme Court
review).
598. See supra Part III.D (showing past laws that limited federal jurisdiction).
599. See supra Part III.E (showing that the federal courts recognize Congress's power and
implement its limits).
600. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,609-12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
not all constitutional claims require judicial review).
601. See id. at 612-13 (noting examples of constitutional claims not subject to judicial
review).
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unreviewable due to standing.6°2 Justice Scalia debunked this assumption as
"untenable": "Members of Congress and the supervising officers of the
executive branch take the same oath to uphold the Constitution that we do, and
sometimes they are left to perform that oath unreviewed, as we always are.
603
Because the Supreme Court is neither the ultimate expositor of the Constitution
nor the guarantor of individual rights, the lack of judicial remedy does not
violate due process.6
Similarly, equal protection does not significantly restrict Congress's
power. This argument automatically equates all distinctions with
discrimination and forgets that "rights don't have rights; people have rights.
605
It equates laws that "distinguish among litigants on the basis of race or other
forbidden criteria" with "jurisdictional statutes that differentiate on the basis of
subject matter.,60 6 Equal protection does not require the federal courts to treat
all constitutional claims the same.607 In addition, these bills apply to both sides
equally. For example, H.R. 1 100 would prevent the American Civil Liberties
Union from appealing an Alabama decision upholding DOMA to federal court.
But it would also keep the Alliance Defense Fund from appealing a
Massachusetts decision striking down DOMA. Furthermore, this equal
protection argument assumes that state courts will not provide adequate
protection for constitutional rights,608 an assumption that is equally as false for
equal protection as for due process.60 9
Moreover, the idea that Congress's motives determine whether limits on
jurisdiction are valid lacks any constitutional basis. 610 First, any "neutral
602. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974)
(dismissing constitutional claim for lack of standing).
603. Webster, 486 U.S. at 613.
604. See supra Part III.B.3.d, notes 448-64, and accompanying text (showing that the
Court is not the ultimate expositor or guardian of rights).
605. Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 73, at 917; Velasco, supra note 13, at 693.
606. Gunther, supra note 13, at 918.
607. See id. at 918 (noting that not all federal question litigation must be handled the same
way); Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 73, at 918 (stating that a right is not entitled to
same treatment as other rights).
608. See Bator, supra note 464, at 625 (stating that one cannot assume that the state courts
will not speak for the Constitution); see also id. at 633 (noting that if a state court reaches a
different constitutional conclusion than a federal court, it has not necessarily disregarded the
Constitution); Velasco, supra note 13, at 694 (same).
609. See supra note 594 and accompanying text (showing that state courts are presumed to
have jurisdiction over federal claims).
610. See supra notes 357-62 and accompanying text (showing that Congress's motive is
meaningless).
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motives" criterion nullifies checks and balances. 61' Because the Court would
ultimately decide whether Congress had the right motives, it would determine
the scope of its own powers. 612 By analogy, suppose that Congress had
impeached and convicted either Presidents Andrew Johnson or Richard Nixon.
If either one declared the impeachment unconstitutional because Congress had
improper motives, such as wanting to dominate the executive branch, he would
have been clearly wrong. If he had refused to leave office based on this claim,
everyone would have recognized this as an illegal, and possibly a tyrannical,
act. He would have been wrong because he would have been nullifying a
constitutional device that is designed to check his power, even if in a particular
instance Congress may have used that device for improper reasons. Likewise,
if the Court were to strike down a limit on its jurisdiction, it would then be
nullifying the checks on its power.61 3 If it simply has to find "improper
motives" to invalidate a limit on its jurisdiction, then self-restraint is its only
limit. This would give the least trusted branch unbounded jurisdiction, which
violates the Founders' intent for the judiciary.61 4
Second, history and case law condemns the "neutral motivation" criterion.
According to the Founders, Congress could make exceptions for any reason,
including public convenience.615 Even the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress's motive is meaningless.61 6
Third, proponents of this "neutral motivation" theory wrongly assert that
617"distrust" of a coordinate branch of the government is an improper motive.
Rather, it is a necessary function of separation of powers and checks and
balances.618 Our entire government is based on distrust of official power, and
the Founders trusted the judiciary even less than they trusted the legislature.
6 9
611. See supra Part III.B. 1 (explaining importance of checks and balances).
612. See Marriage Hearing, supra note 295, at 75, 77, 83 (statement of Michael Gerhardt)
(stating that the Court ultimately decides if Congress has a proper motive).
613. See supra Part III.C (showing that Founders viewed Exceptions Clause as Congress's
check on the Court).
614. See supra Part III.B (explaining principles of legislative preeminence, checks and
balances, and judicial skepticism).
615. See supra notes 213,224,226-35, and accompanying text (demonstrating Founders'
view of why Congress could make exceptions).
616. See supra notes 357-62 and accompanying text (showing that Congress's motive is
meaningless).
617. See Constitution Hearing, supra note 10, at 13-14 (stating that a neutral justification
is required in order for a jurisdiction limit to be valid and distrust of the judiciary is not a neutral
justification).
618. See supra Part III.B. 1 (explaining the interaction of separation of powers and checks
and balances).
619. See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining Founders' distrust of the judiciary).
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Through the presidential veto, the congressional override, the confirmation
requirements for judges and executive officials, the ratification requirement for
treaties, the impeachment process, and even judicial review, one branch of the
government communicates its distrust of the way that others exercise their
power. Is the judiciary entitled to express distrust in Congress's and the
president's ability to interpret the Constitution, 620 and then demand that both
branches blindly trust it? To state the question is to answer it. Hence, distrust
is not an improper motive; rather, it is the engine of the Constitution.62'
Fourth, if distrust is an improper motive that violates due process, then the
bills' critics have also violated due process. Their arguments are premised on
the assumption that state judges will not fulfill their obligations under the
Supremacy Clause to "faithfully protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States., 622 If distrust of the federal courts violates due process, then
equal protection would seem to require that distrust of state courts also violates
due process. Thus, if Congress were to increase federal jurisdiction, it would
not have a neutral reason for doing so (viz., distrust for statejudges). If it were
to decrease federal jurisdiction, it would also not have a neutral reason (viz.,
distrust for federal judges). The arbitrary nature of this requirement indicates
its lack of constitutional merit.
G. Unprecedented Action
Many critics of the recent and pending bills charge that they are
unprecedented.623 They argue that while some of the laws and precedents show
that Congress can regulate federal jurisdiction, none prevented all federal courts
from exercising constitutional review.624 In short: "The very fact that Congress
has never attempted to bar access to all federal courts when a person claims that
a federal statute violates the Constitution is itself a matter of more than minor
620. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text (showing that constitutional
interpretation is not exclusively a judicial function).
62 1. See supra Part III.B. 1 (showing how distrust of power guided the formation of the
Constitution).
622. See supra notes 574-75 and accompanying text (illustrating distrust of state courts).
623. See e.g., H. REl. No. 108-614, at 159-64 (2004) (arguing that H.R. 3313 is
unprecedented).
624. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 108-691, at 105-10 (2004) (trying to distinguish past legislation
and precedent from H.R. 2028); H. Rep. 108-614 at 51, 114, 145, 149, 159-64 (same for H.R.
3313).
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significance. 6 25 As Congress has never done this before, it does not have the
power to restrict the judiciary.
This argument is not completely true. Congress has exercised its power
over jurisdiction at various times and to varying degrees throughout history.626
It has even used this power to keep a certain class of constitutional and federal
law cases out of the federal judiciary altogether.627 This charge might be true
only if it means that Congress has never fully exercised its power. But not
exercising power is not the same as not having power. For example, the federal
courts have never exercised the full scope of their jurisdiction.628 But if
Congress were to extend statutory jurisdiction to its limits, the courts' power
would still be constitutional. It would be unprecedented in the same way as the
recent and pending bills; that is, it would be a delegated power that has never
been exercised to its fullest extent. But it would still be constitutional. The
"unprecedented" argument might be convincing if it were consistent with the
foundational principles, the Founders' statements, congressional practice, and
court precedent. 62 9 But lacking that foundation, it does not threaten the recent
legislation.630
V. Conclusion
The pending jurisdiction withdrawal bills-including the Marriage
Protection Act, the Constitution Restoration Act, and the Pledge Protection
Act-focus attention on controversial social issues like "same-sex marriage"
and the separation of church and state. But they also highlight an even more
controversial underlying debate: the proper role of federal courts in our
political system. As the courts have become more dominant in today's society,
it is increasingly difficult to separate policy from constitutional principles.
625. Letter from Mark Tushnet, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, to the
Honorable John Conyers, Jr., 2 (July 19, 2004), quoted in H. REP. No. 108-614, at 159.
626. See supra Part III.D (showing past jurisdiction limiting legislation).
627. See supra Part III.D.1 (illustrating how early Congresses regulated constitutional
jurisdiction).
628. See IDES & MAY, supra note 258, at 286 (noting that courts have never had full Article
III jurisdiction).
629. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230-40 (1995) (showing that
Justice Scalia considered the unprecedented nature of the law in question). But see id. at 217-
30 (showing that Justice Scalia considered the unprecedented nature of the law only after
considering the text of the Constitution, its principles, and precedents).
630. See supra Part III (showing that the text of the Constitution, its principles,
congressional practice, and court precedent support Congress's power to pass bills like those in
question).
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This Note has focused on one issue: Does the Constitution give Congress
the power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over constitutional issues? 63' To answer this
question, it has examined the text and structure of Article 11I, the Constitution's
foundational principles, and the Constitutional Convention and ratification
debates.632 Fearful of unrestrained power and even more skeptical of the
judiciary, the Founders clearly intended that Congress use the Exceptions
Clause as its weapon of constitutional self-defense against judicial
encroachments.633 Moreover, throughout its history, Congress has exercised
this power to varying degrees, 634 and both the lower courts and Supreme Court
have confirmed Congress's power almost without exception. 635
In addition, this Note has sketched and evaluated various arguments
against the recent bills. 636 Though many seem to rely on the Constitution and
its principles, closer inspection shows that they lack a firm foundation in
constitutional text, principles, history, and precedent. As these theories
ultimately collapse, they further underscore that when it comes to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, "Congress gave,
and Congress hath taken away.,
637
631. See supra Part II (outlining provisions of the jurisdiction limiting bills in the 108th
and 109th Congresses).
632. See supra Part III.B (laying out historical backdrop, text, and debates over the
Constitution).
633. See supra Part III.C (surveying the Founders' statements regarding the Exceptions
Clause).
634. See supra Part III.D (illustrating Congress's past jurisdiction-limiting measures).
635. See supra Part III.E (showing that federal courts have upheld and implemented
Congress's limits).
636. See supra Part IV (noting constitutional objections to Congress's power).
637. See supra note 1 (noting the source for this paraphrase).
1218
